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DESTRUCTIVE COORDINATION
Charles K. Whiteheadt
An important goal of financial risk regulation is promoting coordina-
tion. Law's coordinating function minimizes costly conflict and encourages
greater uniformity among market participants. Likewise, privately developed
market standards, such as standard-form contracts and rules incorporated
into widely used vendor technology systems, help to lower transaction costs
partly by increasing coordination.
By contrast, much of modern financial economics is premised on a
world without coordination. Basic tools used to manage financial risk pre-
sume that changes in asset prices follow a random walk and individuals buy
and sell assets independently. Thus, a bedrock premise of traditional risk
management is that a portfolio manager's actions affect neither the market-
place nor the trading decisions of others.
The result is a paradox: regulations and standards that benefit finan-
cial firms and markets can also impose unintended and significant costs-
what I label "destructive coordination"-by inducing portfolio managers to
act in unison and, in turn, affecting asset prices and eroding the core pre-
sumptions underlying much of financial risk management. Greater uni-
formity can increase the magnitude of a drop in the financial markets, a
result that can have systemic effects.
Going forward, coordination's benefits must be weighed against its
costs, which are often less well understood. Expanding the scope of regula-
tion beyond individual firms-taking into account the collective impact of
coordination on the financial markets and the expectation of market partici-
pants-can help fill gaps in today's regulatory framework. Financial regu-
lators must also consider the role of market standards in promoting
coordination, as individual firms are unlikely to have sufficient incentives
(or information) to police them themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
Promoting coordination is an important function of the law.' A
familiar example is driving on the right-hand side of the road. There
is no intrinsic reason why driving on the right is superior to driving on
the left, and over time (and a few near-accidents), I would likely figure
out which, if any, convention exists where I was travelling. In that
instance, law assists in coordinating actions-for example, it allows
drivers to anticipate what others will do and adjust their responses,2
ordering conduct and, in turn, minimizing the potential for costly
conflict.3 Even if I were to gain individually by driving on the left, I
would be reluctant to risk upsetting a standard that, if uniformly fol-
lowed, significantly benefitted all drivers (including myself).7
I There is extensive scholarship on law's coordinating function, a portion of which I
briefly describe infra at notes 38-59 and accompanying text. The full scholarship includes
analyses of law's effect on the ability of diverse parties to enter into and enforce agree-
ments, set widely accepted standards, provide focal points that minimize unnecessary con-
flict and negotiation, and organize to bring about socially desirable goals that, pursued
individually, would be more likely to fail. See TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF
ETHICAL PosrrivIsM 50-51 (1996) (describing various types of coordination rules); Jules
Coleman, Authority and Reason, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LEGAL PosIIVIsM 287,
304-05 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) [hereinafter AUrONoMY OF LAw] (noting that law's
coordinating function makes possible social institutions that would otherwise not exist be-
cause "none of us is capable either of creating the institutions individually or of organizing
the large-scale collective efforts that would otherwise be necessary"); Richard H. McAdams,
A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1666-68, 1676-78 (2000) (dis-
cussing how legal rules function as focal points for coordinating individual action); Gerald
J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165,
183-86 (1982) (applying coordination principles to judicial decision making); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 969-71 (1995) (describing how rules allow
individuals to overcome collective action problems by encouraging coordinated behavior).
2 See CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 50, 53; DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHI-
CAL STUDY 44-45 (1969); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 976.
3 SeeJoseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in AUTONOMY OF LAw, supra note 1, at 249,
273.
4 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 164-66 (1991).
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Yet, not all coordination is beneficial. Some coordination can
have unintended and costly consequences, which I label destructive co-
ordination. Consider the story of London's Millennium Bridge.5 The
bridge took four years to construct and, in the process, passed a series
of stress tests and code requirements, including a wind tunnel test that
simulated a "once every thousand years" gust and concrete supports
that could withstand the impact of a 4,000-ton boat travelling at thirty-
seven knots.6 Nevertheless, on opening day, the bridge began to sway
wildly, making it impossible for pedestrians to walk or stand.7
What went wrong? Every structure has a natural, resonant fre-
quency. Accordingly, the British design codes (like others around the
world) required engineers to model vibrations from pedestrian traffic
but presumed that large crowds would walk out of step. In effect,
each person's walk was expected to follow a random distribution, with
one pedestrian largely cancelling out another's. What the codes
failed to consider was the prospect of destructive coordination-the
possibility, in this case, that large crowds could naturally begin to co-
ordinate, with costly consequences. Chance correlation resulted in
some pedestrians walking in unison." Others changed their step in
response to a slight give in the bridge.9 The outcome was a positive
feedback loop-the bridge swayed, prompting pedestrians to adjust
their step and, in turn, cause the bridge to sway even more.' 0 Neces-
sary repairs took almost two years and cost $7.5 million to complete.'
Of course, not all coordination is destructive. In the financial
markets, coordination helps to minimize costs and promote stability.' 2
Banks, for example, are required to set aside capital against prospec-
tive losses, creating a cushion against insolvency and reducing the risk
of failure but also increasing the costs of traditional lending.1 3 Regu-
lators, therefore, needed to level the regulatory playing field. Global
5 For this analogy, I draw on observations made in J6n Danielsson & Hyun Song
Shin, Endogenous Risk, in MODERN RISK MANAGEMENT: A HISTORY 297, 297-99 (2003) [here-
inafter MODERN RISK MANAGEMENT].
6 Richard Morrison, Bridge of Dreams, TIMES (UK), June 6, 2000, at 4; see DEYAN
SUDJIC, BLADE OF LIGHT: THE STORY OF LONDON'S MILLENNIUM BRIDGE 32, 36 (2001).
7 See Ian Sample, The Bridge of Sways, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 31, 2001, at 38, 40.
8 See STEVEN STROGATz, SYNc 172-74 (2003); SUDJIC, supra note 6, at 84; Morrison,
supra note 6.
9 See Mahmoud M. Abdulrehem & Edward Ott, Low Dimensional Description of Pedes-
trian-Induced Oscillation of the Millennium Bridge, 19 CHAOS 013129-1, 013129-1 (2009), http:/
/chaos.aip.org/resource/ 1/chaoeh/v19/il/p01 3129sl ?bypassSSO=1.
10 See id.; Steven H. Strogatz et al., Crowd Synchrony on the Millennium Bridge, NATURE,
Nov. 2005, at 43.
I 1 See T.R. Reid, After Shaky Start, London Bridge Reopens; Nearly Two Years of Modifica-
tions Take the Wobble Out of Millennium Project, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2002, at A14.
12 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State,
95 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 32-35) (on file with author).
13 See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14-16
(2010).
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standards were developed in part so that banks in one country would
not be disadvantaged relative to banks in another. 14
Beyond regulation, financial market participants also reduce
transaction costs by improving coordination through market stan-
dards. Standard-form contracts, for example, lower the expense of
negotiating deals whose terms have become industry convention. Net-
work benefits also flow from common use, including less uncertainty
over a contract's meaning and consistent business practices around
how its terms are implemented.1 5  In addition, new technology
reduces the costs of complying with regulation and best practices.
Vendor-developed systems automate compliance and, in the process,
make it more likely that different firms (using the same systems) will
respond to market change in the same manner.16
Coordination, therefore, is a goal of many financial market par-
ticipants. By contrast, the basic tools used to manage financial risk-
like the British design codes-presume a world of independent ac-
tors. Within this world, one manager's decision to buy or sell assets
does not influence others' actions or affect changes in the market-
place. Managers act separately, each on their own.1 7 Coordination,
therefore, is inconsistent with the analytical framework underlying
much of financial risk management.
The result is a paradox: regulations and standards that benefit
financial firms and markets can also be destructive. By promoting co-
ordination, regulations and standards can erode key presumptions un-
derlying financial risk management, reducing its effectiveness and
magnifying the systemic impact of a downturn in the financial mar-
kets.18 Following a drop in asset price, for example, capital regulation
can increase a manager's cost of holding impaired assets. As different
managers experience similar effects, they are likely to react in the
same way by each selling assets, causing greater price volatility and
14 See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
18 In this Article, systemic risk and similar terms mean those factors that increase the
risk of a significant loss of value by, or confidence in, the financial system, in turn, often by
limiting retail and institutional access to capital, resulting in a significant downturn in the
real economy. See GROUP OF TEN, REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 126
(2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf; see also Olivier de Bandt & Phi-
lipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey 10-13 (European Cent. Bank Working Paper No. 35,
2000) (establishing "a framework for the economic analysis of systemic risk"); John B. Tay-
lor, Defining Systemic Risk Operationally, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOuTs As WE KNow
THEM 33, 34-37 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., 2009) (producing an operational definition
of systemic risk as a means to set limits on government bailouts). A catalogue of definitions
of systemic risk appears in Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 983, and Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196-204 (2008).
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prompting further sales. The result is a cascading decline in value,
with greater coordination impairing each firm's ability to manage its
own risk exposure.' 9 In short, although regulation and market stan-
dards can help reduce systemic risk,20 they themselves can also become
a systemic risk.21
Behavioral economists argue that herding can inflate asset
prices-portfolio managers buy assets, as part of a crowd, to reduce
the chance of being second-guessed or to mimic investors who are
considered to be better able to assess value.22 This behavior typically
results in an asset bubble-a run-up in price unsupported by the as-
set's fundamentals. 23 Under those conditions, a later drop in price
(or other event) can trigger more herding, but in reverse, causing
some managers to sell assets, creating another drop in price and spur-
ring further sales.24 The magnitude of the drop, and how long it is
sustained, will depend on the number of managers prompted by the
event to sell assets. Within a diverse group, the range of such events is
likely to be limited. Different managers will find different events to be
more or less relevant than others, with some responses (to hold or
buy) offsetting the impact of others (to sell) and vice versa.25 Greater
19 See infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 205-06 (advocating systemic risk regulation);
Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. PoLY 671, 679-732 (2010) (describing proposals to reduce systemic risk).
21 My argument extends beyond the debate over the role of regulation leading up to
the 2007 financial crisis. Those arguments have largely focused on regulation's inadequacy
or inability to keep up with evolving financial markets. On inadequacy, see, for example,
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Betterldea?,
95 VA. L. REV. 707, 727, 731-37 (2009) (arguing that under-regulation fueled the subprime
mortgage meltdown and credit crisis); Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securi-
tization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1327, 1333 (2009)
(stating that deregulation played a "key determining role" in the creation of products that
led up to financial crisis). On regulation's inability to keep up with change in the financial
markets, see, for example, James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk
Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 731, 751-55
(2009) (arguing that the complexity of new financial instruments and activities poses sig-
nificant problems for regulation and risk management); Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Re-
form in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, at 15 (Mar. 10, 2009) (unpublished
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398207 (noting the need for a "ma-
jor overhaul" of bank and insurance regulations currently "designed to cover a much nar-
rower and simpler set of business activities and instruments").
22 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 767, 783-84 (2002); Kenneth A. Froot et al., Herd on the Street: Informational
Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation, 47J. FIN. 1461, 1461-62 (1992); David S.
Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. EcON. REv. 465, 465-66
(1990).
23 Some famous asset bubbles, and the psychology around them, are described in
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 35-53 (1999).
24 See Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles and Crashes, 71 ECONOMETRICA
173, 173-76 (2003).
25 See id. In that respect, the analysis is similar to John Keynes's well-known compari-
son of the stock market to a beauty contest:
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coordination, by contrast, broadens the range of events likely to pro-
voke a similar response-influencing managers' expectations and in-
creasing the pressure to herd.26 As the Committee on the Global
Financial System, Bank for International Settlements, recently cau-
tioned (regarding global regulation), "[C]onvergence to a single risk
assessment or risk management framework . .. would encourage herd
behaviour and weaken financial stability."27
Perhaps the most well-known-and a more direct-example of
destructive coordination in the financial markets is the feedback loop
that helped fuel the Black Monday crash of 1987. Portfolio insurance,
which exacerbated the feedback loop, involved widely used computer
programs that automatically executed orders to sell shares when
prices fell to prespecified levels. Black Monday followed a sustained
bull market during which stock prices rose substantially. Concerns
about overvalued stocks caused some investors to sell shares, starting a
decline in price that triggered a downward spiral of selling by portfo-
lio insurance programs across the marketplace. Those sales sparked
further price declines and additional sales as shares reached new price
levels.28
[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions
in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a
hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose
choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competi-
tors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which
he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem
from the same point of view.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 156
(1936).
26 See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
27 Bank for Int'l Settlements, Comm. on the Global Fin. Sys., Long-Term Issues in Inter-
national Banking 31 (CGFS Papers No. 41, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
cgfs41.pdf; see also Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Com-
ment 16-21 (Nov. 20, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1697348&download=yes (describing the perils of regu-
latory harmonization that resulted in "converging strategies, which exacerbated [financial
intermediaries'] financial difficulties as many institutions simultaneously sought to sell sim-
ilar assets to shore up their capital").
28 See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. The May 2010 "flash crash" was also
prompted, in part, by parallel trading activity. On May 6, 2010, a large institutional trader
initiated a sell program to hedge an existing equity position, using an automated execution
program to sell futures contracts without regard to price or time. Sudden price declines in
the equity markets caused the automated trading systems of other large market partici-
pants to temporarily "pause" their trading-neither buying nor selling stocks. A pause can
be an effective way to halt a downward spiral such as the one that occurred during Black
Monday. However, when everyone pauses in unison, a pause can also make it increasingly
difficult to buy and sell stocks as participants withdraw from the market, potentially causing
a sudden and substantial drop in price. See FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF
MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON EMERGING REGUlATORY ISsUEs 1-7 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/201 0/marketevents-report.pdf.
328
DESTRUCTIVE COORDINATION
Coordination's destructive effects suggest that regulators must be
sensitive to legislation's ability to promote uniformity. In fact, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
Dodd-Frank Act, or the Act),29 enacted in July 2010, grants considera-
ble discretion to regulators to implement new rules and potentially
increase uniformity among financial market participants. For exam-
ple, significant nonbank financial firms may now become subject to
new Federal Reserve Board (FRB) oversight,30 including requirements
related to capital, leverage, liquidity, market concentration, and risk
management.3  The Act requires the FRB, to the extent possible, to
take account of significant differences in business and operations
when implementing new regulation.3 2 Still, by falling under the same
regulator, the Act leaves open the likelihood of greater uniformity
among large nonbank financial firms. Of course, imposing the same
rules on similar businesses has important benefits, such as minimizing
the arbitrage that can result if small changes in business cause sharp
changes in regulatory cost.53  Nevertheless, as new rules are intro-
duced, regulators must be sensitive to the negative effects of greater
coordination and the system-wide consequences that may follow.
Here, the Dodd-Frank Act offers some hope. Among its duties,
the new Financial Stability Oversight Council (the Oversight Council)
must identify risks to U.S. financial stability arising from activities in or
outside the financial services marketplace.3 4 As part of its mandate,
the Oversight Council is required to "identify gaps in regulation that
could pose risks to" U.S. financial stability35 and make recommenda-
tions to primary financial regulatory agencies to "apply new or height-
ened standards and safeguards for financial activities or practices that
could create or increase risks" among financial firms and markets.36
On their face, both provisions authorize the Oversight Council to as-
sess the systemic consequences (and costs) of financial regulation and
market standards that promote coordination and propose or recom-
mend changes that take account of coordination's destructive effects.
A key question is whether, in line with the Act, regulators will balance
29 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
30 Id. §§ 112(a)(2)(H), 113, 124 Stat. at 1394-1402 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5322, 5323).
31 Id. §§ 115(b), 165, 124 Stat. at 1403-04, 1423 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325,
5364).
32 Id. §§ 115(b) (3), 165(b) (3), 124 Stat. at 1404, 1424-25 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
%§ 5325(b) (3), 5365(b) (3)).
33 Id. §§ 115(b)(3)(B), 165(b)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 1404, 1425 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 5325(b) (3) (B), 5365(b) (3) (B)).
34 Id. §§ 111, 112, 124 Stat. at 1392-98 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5322).
35 Id. § 112(a) (2) (G), 124 Stat. at 1395 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2) (G)).
36 Id. § 112(a) (2) (K), 124 Stat. at 1395 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2) (K)).
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coordination's benefits against its costs in developing new systemic
risk regulation.
Part I of this Article reviews the benefits of coordination, drawing
on specific examples from the financial markets. It then introduces
basic concepts that inform a substantial portion of modem financial
risk management. Those concepts, at their heart, presume that indi-
vidual portfolio managers act independently and that their actions af-
fect neither asset prices nor the actions of others. This Part also
introduces Value at Risk (VaR), the most widely adopted of the risk
management technologies, and discusses regulations and standards
that incorporate VaR.
Part II describes the resulting paradox. Regulation and standards
that promote coordination-and benefit the financial markets-can
also be destructive, eroding the presumptions that make financial risk
management effective. In addition, technology systems that imple-
ment regulation and best practices can reinforce standardization
across financial firms. This Part also considers coordination's rela-
tionship to herding, arguing that it creates negative externalities that
regulators must take into account in regulating the financial markets.
Financial regulation and standards typically center on individual
firms, each considered separately.3 7 Part III argues that, going for-
ward, in order to fill gaps in today's regulatory framework, regula-
tion's scope must extend beyond individual firms and take into
account coordination's collective impact on the financial markets. In
addition, regulators must oversee market standards that, like regula-
tion, can promote coordination. Those standards reduce transaction
costs, and so individual firms are unlikely to have sufficient incentives
(or information) to police them themselves.
I
COORDINATION AND RANDOMNESS
Coordination's benefits must be balanced against its destructive
potential. This Part begins by describing those benefits, drawing on
examples from the financial markets. It then reviews key presump-
tions underlying financial risk management, as well as the example of
VaR. The next Part considers the resulting paradox-the likelihood
that, in a world that presumes randomness, regulation and market
standards that promote coordination can also be destructive.
A. Coordination
Three game theory models-the Stag Hunt, the Dove-Hawk, and
the Battle of the Sexes Games-help illustrate coordination problems
37 See infta note 126 and accompanying text.
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in the financial markets. 38 A coordination problem arises when the
outcome of one person's decision rests on the uncertain actions of
third parties.3 9 This problem involves a cost-the risk that the deci-
sion will not be optimal in light of the outcome's dependence. 40 In
response, regulation and market standards can increase certainty and
lower costs by mandating some actions and ruling out others.4 '
Figure 1 depicts the Stag Hunt Game, which involves two players
who have the same preferences. If Player 2 selects Strategy A (a pay-
out of 4 or 0, depending on Player 1's decision), then Player 1 would
be better off also selecting Strategy A (a payout of 4) rather than Strat-
egy B (a payout of 3). If Player 2 instead selects Strategy B (a payout
of 3 in both cases), then Player 1 would also be better off selecting
Strategy B (a payout of 3) rather than Strategy A (a payout of 0). The
key to the Stag Hunt is in each strategy's relative riskiness for each
player. There are two coordinated outcomes-A/A and B/B. Select-
ing Strategy A can result in a payout of 4, but if the other player picks
Strategy B, it instead yields a payout of 0. Strategy B is less risky for
both players because it always results in a payout of 3, but at the ex-
pense of reducing the maximum possible return. On balance, absent
assurance over what the other player will do, each player is likely to
pick Strategy B-the safer approach-resulting in a B/B equilibrium,
even though A/A would have yielded a higher payout for both. 4 2
FIGURE 1: STAG HUNT GAME
Player 2
Strategy A Strategy B
Strategy A 4,4 0,3
Strategy B 3,0 3,3
38 Descriptions of the three coordination games come from Richard H. McAdams,
Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209,
219-24 (2009).
39 See Postema, supra note 1, at 173.
40 See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 14-15 (2001); LEWIS, supra note 2, at 24-25; Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A
Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1153, 1188-89 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 970-71.
41 See Scott A. Beaulier et al., Knowledge, Economics, and Coordination: Understanding
Hayek's Legal Theory, I N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 209, 211-15 (2005); Emily Sherwin, Legal Rules
and Social Reform, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 455, 462-63 (1999).
42 The game's reference to a "stag hunt" comes from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's brief
illustration of the choice between hunting stag and hunting hare. SeeJEANJACQUES Rous-
SEAu, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 57-58 (Patrick Coleman ed., Franklin
Philip trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994). In the parable, the hunters must work as a team in
order to catch a stag-which is the best outcome (A/A). Hunting hare is less risky, since
3312011]
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The Stag Hunt Game has a parallel in the financial markets.
Banks typically rely on short-term credit (deposits) to invest in a port-
folio of longer-term assets (loans). Depositors, as a whole, benefit by
pooling money that the bank can then lend (an A/A outcome) but
suffer if a substantial number of other depositors withdraw funds first
(an A/B or B/A outcome). In the latter circumstance, a bank may
not be able to sell its assets quickly enough or at the right prices to
repay everyone. 43 Even if the bank is healthy, a loss of confidence may
cause depositors to rush to withdraw money first-a bank run-rather
than risk being last in line to be repaid (a B/B outcome, assuming all
depositors are made whole) .44 Depositors, therefore, face a collective
action problem. If none of them withdraws, the bank can continue
business as usual. Panicked depositors, however, without the ability to
gauge a bank's health or each other's actions, may rush to withdraw
money from a stable bank, thereby causing the rumor of failure to
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A credible commitment among de-
positors that they will all keep their money in the bank is practically
impossible, since depositors are dispersed and constantly changing.
The alternative has been to create an insurance program, directed by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which protects depositors
up to $250,000.45 An A/A outcome-no bank run-is more likely,
because depositors have assurances of repayment (regardless of why
the bank failed) and are now less likely to withdraw funds first.
Figure 2 depicts the Dove-Hawk Game, also involving two play-
ers, but whose interests are in greater conflict than in the Stag Hunt
Game. The optimal coordinated response is Dove/Dove, but the pres-
sure to defect is significant because it doubles the defector's return. If
Player 2 is a Dove (a payout of 2 or 0, depending on Player 1's deci-
sion), Player 1's optimal response is to be a Hawk (a payout of 4 in-
each hunter can easily do so on his own. The problem is that if one hunter later decides to
catch hare, the entire stag hunt will fail (A/B or B/A). See id. Like Players 1 and 2, the
hunters face a coordination problem and, absent a means for all hunters to credibly com-
mit to hunting stag, each of them will likely decide to simply hunt hare (B/B).
43 See Whitehead, supra note 13, at 13 (describing the impact of a bank run on a
bank's sale of assets).
44 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and
Bank Regulation, 59 J. Bus. 55, 63 (1986); see also Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 15; McAdams,
supra note 38, at 221. Although less common today, the United States has had bank runs
in the past-the basis for the scene in Frank Capra's 1946 film, IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE
(Liberty Films 1946), when residents of the Bedford Falls township flocked to the strug-
gling Bailey Brothers Building and Loan to get their money back.
45 Brief descriptions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation program and
other government-directed insurance programs appear in Appendix A of Whitehead, supra
note 13, at 45-46. Historically, other alternatives to prevent bank runs included the sus-
pension of convertibility of notes and deposits into cash and the use of collateral. See Gary
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, at 17-19 (Oct. 18,
2010) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 /papers.cfm?
abstract~id=1676947.
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stead of 2). Likewise, if Player 1 is a Dove (a payout of 2 or 0), Player
2's optimal response is to be a Hawk (a payout of 4 instead of 2).
Each player, therefore, prefers to be a Hawk, but only if the other is a
Dove. If both players defect, the result will be Hawk/Hawk-an out-
come that neither prefers, as it is the worst possible payout for both
(each receives a payout of -1).
FIGURE 2: DovE-HAwK GAME
The Dove-Hawk Game also has a parallel in the financial mar-
kets. During the 1980s, global competition caused bank-capital levels
to fall dangerously low. 46 Capital provides a cushion against loans and
other losses, but it can be expensive for banks to set aside, thereby
increasing the cost of extending loans and reducing profitability.47
The Basel Capital Accord (the Basel Accord, or the Accord), first
adopted in 1988, called for regulators to impose a minimum capital
level of 8% of risk-weighted assets on internationally active banks.48
46 See SECRETARIAT OF THE BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE NEW BASEL
CAPITAL ACCORD: AN EXPLANATORY NOTE 11 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsca0l.pdf.
47 See Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49
HARV. INT'L LJ. 447, 500-01 (2008). Financial regulation directly and indirectly restricts
the amounts and types of risk bearing that a financial firm can assume: directly by circum-
scribing the riskiness of a firm's portfolio and capital structure and indirectly through rules
regarding the firm's net worth, capital, or surplus that effectively cap its risk-taking activi-
ties. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1,
15-18, 23-24 (1976); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Indus-
try: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 352-59 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1153, 1165 (1988).
48 Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global Convergence in Banking
Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 433, 438 (2001). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
adopted the Accord. The Basel Committee, established in 1974 by the central bank gover-
nors of the GIO countries under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements, is
comprised of central bankers and regulators from the world's principal financial markets.
See History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://
www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). Its purpose is to foster interna-
tional cooperation on supervisory standards, practices, and guidelines for banks. Commit-
tee decisions are reached by a consensus, although the Committee's pronouncements are
nonbinding on members. Nevertheless, the Basel Committee has strongly influenced the
gradual convergence in global banking regulation and supervision. Chief among its suc-
Player 2 Dove Hawk
Dove 2,2 0,4
Hawk 4,0 -1, -1
3332011]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
As capital is costly, setting a higher level in one country (a Dove)
would give banks in other countries (each a Hawk) a competitive ad-
vantage, yielding a Dove/Hawk payout favoring banks that were sub-
ject to a lower capital requirement. Permitting banks to continue to
compete without restriction would have depressed capital levels even
further-a Hawk/Hawk outcome in light of the increased risk of
global financial distress. The Basel Accord facilitated a Dove/Dove
payout among competing players-principally U.S., U.K, and Japa-
nese regulators and banks-both by committing them to level the
global playing field 49 and reinforcing expectations that other partici-
pants would continue to cooperate.50
Lastly, Figure 3 depicts the Battle of the Sexes Game, involving
two players who prefer different strategies but would be worse off if
they failed to coordinate. If Player 2 selects Strategy B, Player 1 is
better off also selecting Strategy B (a payout of 1 instead of 0). Like-
wise, if Player 1 selects Strategy A, Player 2 is better off also selecting
Strategy A (again, a payout of 1 instead of 0). Neither player benefits
if there is a mixed outcome, A/B or B/A, and so both agree it would
be best to coordinate. The players disagree, however, over what strat-
egy to follow-Player 1's optimal outcome is A/A, and Player 2's opti-
mal outcome is B/B.5 1
In the financial markets, the Battle of the Sexes Game appears in
the widespread use of standard-form contracts, like those created by
cesses has been the creation of uniform bank capital requirements, embodied (as
amended from time to time) in the Basel Accord. See Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your
Sign -International Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MicH. J. INT'L L. 695, 720-25 (2006);
see also Fanto, supra note 21, at 736-37 (summarizing the Accord's evolving approach to
managing risk).
49 See Gadinis, supra note 47, at 502-03; Whitehead, supra note 48, at 720-25. For a
summary of the conflict that existed among national regulators and between regulators
and banks, see ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY INTERNATIONAL Fi-
NANCE AND THE STATE 113-28 (1994). Some commentators have suggested that the Accord
is better represented by the Battle of the Sexes Game, which I describe below. See, e.g.,
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34YALEJ. INT'L L.
113, 124 (2009) (describing the Battle of the Sexes Game as representing one type of
problem that may hinder international cooperation efforts). The Dove-Hawk Game, how-
ever, more accurately illustrates the conflict between players and the potential for one
player to obtain a greater payout at the other's expense. Banks in different jurisdictions
stood to gain substantially if their competitors became subject to higher capital require-
ments. See Gadinis, supra note 47, at 501-02. The cheating alleged to have occurred by
some Accord signatories further evidences that conflict. See McCoy, supra note 48, at
449-55.
50 See Whitehead, supra note 48, at 738-41.
51 The name Battle of the Sexes refers to a common illustration of the game. In it,
Players I and 2 are husband and wife who decide to spend the evening together. Player 1
prefers attending the ballet, and Player 2 prefers going to a boxing match. Notwithstand-
ing their differences, both still prefer spending the evening together, and so an A/A or B/
B outcome-being together either in orchestra seating or at ringside-is preferable to
spending the evening alone. See Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 28.
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FIGURE 3: BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) .52 All par-
ties can benefit from standardization, as regularity in contracting low-
ers the cost of repeated trades.5 3 Network externalities also flow from
common use, reducing uncertainty over the meaning and implemen-
tation of contract terms.5 4 ISDA's Credit Support Annex (CSA) is one
example.55  The CSA defines the credit support obligations of
counterparties to derivatives when those counterparties agree to be
bound by it.56 Although the CSA can be amended-and some parties
favor some terms over others (Strategy A vs. Strategy B)-there is an
overall bias in favor of adopting it and similar instances of standardiza-
tion (an A/A or B/B outcome),5 7 in part because it reflects a market-
wide consensus58 that is preferable to negotiating ad hoc credit sup-
port terms.59 Market participants, like players in the Battle of the
Sexes Game, had a strong incentive to create a market standard (a
payout of 3, 1 or 1, 3) and little incentive to deviate (a payout of 0, 0).
The Stag Hunt, Dove-Hawk, and Battle of the Sexes Games are
all simple models based on fixed payouts. Those payouts, however,
52 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1129,
1139-41 (2006).
53 See Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets, 29
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 127, 165-70 (2005); Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association:
Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 211, 232-33, 236-37 (2001). For examples of increased uncertainty that can result
from common use, see infra note 172.
54 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REv. 757, 761, 774-75 (1995); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Law-
making: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 132-33, 144-46,
157-58 (2005).
55 See INT'L SWAPs & DERIVATIVEs Ass'N [ISDA], 1994 ISDA CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX
(1994) (Subject to New York Law Only) [hereinafter CSA].
56 See ISDA, USER'S GUIDE TO THE 1994 ISDA CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX 1 (1994).
57 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MicH. L. REv. 1033, 1053-55
(2006).
58 See Klausner, supra note 54, at 827-28; Levit, supra note 54, at 129, 167-68, 182.
59 See ISDA, 2005 ISDA COLLATERAL GUIDELINES 21-23 (2005), available at http://
www.isda.org/publications/pdf/2005isdacollateralguidelines.pdf; Norman Menachem
Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 677, 741; see also
infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
Player 2 Strategy A Strategy B
Player 1
Strategy A 3,1 0,0
Strategy B 0,0 1,3
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can change over time. Greater coordination can reduce costs within a
growing group of players-a network benefit that increases payouts as
coordination becomes a self-reinforcing outcome. Greater coordina-
tion, however, can also be costly. Recall that, on the Millennium
Bridge, the costs of coordinating grew as more pedestrians began to
walk in unison. "Defection" by some-if they had walked out of
step-would have benefitted everyone (including those who were al-
ready coordinating). Coordination's costs, in that case, outweighed
its benefits.60
Is there a correct balance? One alternative, if coordination is de-
structive, is to avoid promoting coordination altogether. Another is to
limit coordination to a defined group or mandate a coordination
strategy for some players and not for others. A third alternative, if the
technology exists, is to adopt a strategy that takes account of greater
coordination among a growing universe of players. I return to this
question later,61 but first describe the core presumptions underlying
financial risk management and the example of VaR.
B. Probability, Randomness, and Games Against Nature
Much of modern financial economics is premised on a world
without coordination. Rational individuals separately seek to maxi-
mize wealth, each guided by their own self-interest. The aggregate
result is an optimal allocation of resources to those who can use them
most productively.62 A risk manager is understood to also seek strate-
gies that minimize risk (relative to return) without affecting market
prices or the value of others' holdings.63 Both of these concepts pre-
60 Roberta Romano has made a similar point about regulatory harmonization. When
the effects of regulation are uncertain, the potential for regulatory error may argue in
favor of diversity across regulatory regimes. See Romano, supra note 27, at 18.
61 See infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
62 Recall Adam Smith's well-known description:
[Every individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the sup-
port of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own secur-
ity; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423
(Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776). This account extends, as well, into
the semistrong theory of the capital markets, which posits that stock prices efficiently adjust
to information as it becomes publicly available, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Wok, 25J. FIN. 383, 404 (1970); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier
H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 555 (1984), a concept
that our federal securities laws incorporate, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246
n.24 (1988).
63 SeeJ6n Danfelsson, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Limits to Risk Modelling, 26J. BANKING
& FIN. 1273, 1274 (2002).
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sume that individuals buy and sell assets independently-a presump-
tion integral to many of today's financial risk management tools. 64
Financial risk, in this context, can be objectively estimated. 65 The
classic illustration is the coin toss. Suppose your law firm's managing
partner tells you that your year-end bonus will be $5,000 but that the
amount can be adjusted-potentially up to $10,000 or down to $0-
based on the toss of a coin. You must decide up front how many times
she will flip it. The rule is that, with one toss, you will receive an addi-
tional payment of $5,000 if the coin shows heads (a total bonus of
$10,000), but you will give up the entire $5,000 bonus if it shows tails
(a total bonus of $0). If you pick two tosses, you will receive $2,500
each time the coin is heads and give up $2,500 each time it is tails. If
you choose three tosses, you will receive $1,666.66 for each heads and
give up $1,666.66 for each tails, and so on. The expected value (EV)
of your total bonus after one or two flips will be $5,000. Likewise, the
calculations for three, four, 500, or more flips will all result in the
same EV, $5,000.66
DIAGRAM 1: DIsTRuBUTION OF YEAR-END BONUSES
No. of Tosses
1000 Tosses
$0 $2,500 $5,000 $7,500 $10,000
Total Bonus Amounts
64 For the example of VaR, see infra notes 83-122 and accompanying text.
65 In this Article, financial risk is the statistical probability that the return on a finan-
cial asset (for example, a stock, bond, or other security) will fall short of its expected out-
come. See PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL
RISK 75 (3d ed. 2007). By contrast, "uncertainty" exists when the distribution of possible
outcomes is unknown or unquantifiable. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND
PROFIT 231-35 (1921).
66 For one toss, EV is the sum of a 50% chance of $10,000 (50% x $10,000) + a 50%
chance of no bonus (50% x $0). For two tosses, EV is the sun of a 25% chance of two
heads (25% x $10,000) + a 50% chance of one head and one tail (50% x $5,000) + a 25%
chance of two tails (25% x $0). In the case of three tosses, there is a 12.5% chance of three
heads (12.5% x $10,000), a 37.5% chance of two heads and one tail (37.5% x $6,666.67), a
37.5% chance of two tails and one head (37.5% x $3,333.33), and a 12.5% chance of three
tails (12.5% x $0). Totaling them up (and after rounding), the sum of $1,250 + $2,500 +
$1,250 + $0 results again in an EV of $5,000.
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So, if EV is a constant, why choose more than one flip of the coin?
For each toss, the probability of heads or tails is 50%.67 By picking just
one toss, your entire bonus would rest on a single flip-you could end
up with $10,000, but you could just as equally end up with nothing.
Two tosses would halve the amount you receive for each toss of heads,
but your chance of receiving some amount of bonus would increase as
well. The same would be true for three or more tosses. In each case,
selecting more flips would lower the risk of receiving less than $5,000,
but in return, it would also lower the probability of receiving more than
$5,000. If the number of tosses your colleagues picked ranged be-
tween one and 1,000, we would expect the total number of outcomes
to fall along a symmetrical bell curve (a "normal distribution") like in
Diagram 1. The graph's x-axis is the range of possible bonuses (from
$0 to $10,000) and the y-axis is the number of times the coin was
tossed (from zero to 1,000), with the curve's highest point (1,000
tosses) being near its middle ($5,000).68 The number of times the
bonus was greater than $5,000 roughly equals the number of times it
was less, resulting in a firm-wide average of about $5,000 per person.
For your bonus, the greater the number of flips, the greater the
probability would be that the aggregate of all tosses would result in an
amount falling somewhere near $5,000. Yet, even by picking 1,000 or
more tosses, there would be no guarantee of heads turning up exactly
50% of the time, resulting in a dispersion of possible outcomes
around $5,000. In some cases, you might receive more than $5,000,
but to the extent the dispersion fell below 50% heads (on the left side
of the curve), it would reflect the financial risk of your receiving less
than $5,000.69 That risk typically declines-the dispersion around
$5,000 contracts-as the number of coin tosses increases.70
In financial risk terms, by choosing more tosses, you will have di-
versified your portfolio of possible outcomes, thus reducing the risk of
loss from any one toss as well as the level of dispersion around $5,000,
but doing so without reducing EV. The same concept drives the diver-
sification principle in modern portfolio theory: an investor's exposure
to change in the market value of a portfolio of assets ("market risk")
67 I ignore, for this purpose, a recent study that found a roughly 1% dynamical bias in
favor of a coin landing in the same way it started. See Persi Diaconis et al., Dynamical Bias in
the Coin Toss, 49 Soc'v INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS 211, 231 (2007).
68 See JEAN-PHILIPPE BouCHARD & MARc PoTTERs, THEORY OF FINANCIAL RISKS: FROM
STATISTICAL PHYsICS To RISK MANAGEMENT 8-10 (2000).
69 See JORION, supra note 65, at 88 (measuring risk as the dispersion of possible out-
comes);James E. Meyer et al., Loss of Business Profits, Risk, and the Appropriate Discount Rate, 4
J. LEGAL ECON. 27, 33 (1994).
70 See MELVIN H4AUSNER, ELEMENTARY PROBABILTY THEORY 232-33 (1977); JORION,
supra note 65, at 163.
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becomes more tractable as she diversifies her holdings.71 To the ex-
tent a risk can affect the entire market ("systematic risk"), diversifica-
tion is ineffective to reduce its impact on portfolio value. A general
rise in interest rates, for example, would tend to cause a decline in the
prices of all the shares an investor owns. Diversification, however,
helps manage risks that are unique to each investment ("specific" or
"nonsystematic" risk), including fluctuations in market price ("volatil-
ity"), so long as the correlation across assets is not perfectly positive.72
Like the coin toss, an investor's decision to diversify her holdings
reduces the risk of loss from any one investment because gains from
other investments can offset that loss. Unlike the coin toss, however,
there will always be some correlation across assets-reflecting system-
atic risk-so that diversification can reduce total risk but cannot com-
pletely eliminate it."
Let's return to your bonus. Before deciding how many tosses to
select, you would have no way of predicting the outcome of any one
flip of the coin. Even after the first, second, and third tosses, how the
coin landed next would be independent of prior and subsequent out-
comes. Looking at the firm-wide results, however, you could estimate
the likelihood of receiving $5,000 based on the number of tosses se-
lected as well as the risk that your tosses might result in a bonus below
$5,000.74 In the same way, financial risk management presumes that
changes in a security's price, whether up or down, are unrelated to
prior or subsequent changes or to changes in the prices of other se-
71 See HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF IN-
VESTMENTS 5 (2d ed. 1991). The literature on the use of diversification to reduce risk is
vast. Harry Markowitz's work formed the basis of further contributions by Merton Miller
and William Sharpe, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences with Markowitz in
1990.
72 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PORATE FINANCE 160-62 & nn.26-2 7 (8th ed. 2006). For example, if the investor owns
shares of Companies A, B, C, and D, which are in separate business lines, a drop in Com-
pany A's share price (resulting from a failed business project) could be offset by increases
in the share prices of Companies B, C, and D (one or more of which could rise in response
to a successful business project).
7 See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 (1952). The systematic risk of
a security relative to the general market is also referred to as "beta" risk. A broad market
index has a beta of one. Securities that are more volatile than the market index have betas
greater than one, and securities that tend to be more stable than the market have betas less
than one. Investors can diversify away nonsystematic risk at low cost. Thus, the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) concludes that an investor's returns-the amount she receives
for the risks she bears-are largely set by reference to her portfolio's systematic risk expo-
sure. A portfolio of securities whose prices vary considerably with changes in the market
(like common stock) are exposed to greater systematic risk and potentially greater returns
than a portfolio whose securities have little systematic exposure (like short-term Treasur-
ies). See Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Geneal-
ogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 546, 568-70 (1994).
74 See BOUCHARD & PorrTERS, supra note 68, at 1-2.
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curities. Financial economists refer to this concept as "randomness."7 5
In an efficient market, factors that drive a change in price may not
influence (or be indicative of) other changes. For example, differ-
ences of opinion over value, competition among market actors, and
the release of new information all are likely to cause successive, inde-
pendent changes in a security's price.7 6 Thus, securities prices-like
single flips of a coin-follow an individually unpredictable "random
walk."7 7 In aggregate, however, changes in price form a normal distri-
bution-like the distribution of bonuses-from which individual in-
vestors may estimate future change.78
A risk manager's job, in the face of randomness, is sometimes
described as a "game against nature."79 The risk manager can esti-
mate the likelihood of a change in market conditions as well as how
the change can affect her portfolio's value. Whether a portfolio gains
or loses value will depend on both the risk management strategy that
the risk manager selects and what actually occurs. To illustrate, a
player knows the probabilities of winning and losing in roulette before
the ball is spun.80 Whether the player actually wins or loses will de-
pend on how the bet is placed (strategy) and where the roulette ball
lands (what actually occurs) .81 The strategy (putting all the chips on
black) will not affect the spin of the ball, and if the player plays twice,
where the ball lands first will not affect where it lands next. Like rou-
lette, a risk manager's strategy is presumed not to affect the world.
Share prices continue to follow a random walk, unaffected by
whatever strategy the risk manager selected, and the two together de-
termine whether the portfolio is a "winner" or "loser."82
75 See Peter H. Huang, Securities Price Risks and Financial Derivative Markets, 21 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 589, 590-91 (2001). VaR, for example, assumes that day-to-day fluctuations
in returns are random. See LINDA ALLEN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING MARKET, CREDIT, AND OP-
ERATIONAL RISK: THE VALUE AT RISK APPROACH 8-9 (2004).
76 See Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55, 55-57.
77 See RALF KORN & ELKE KORN, OPTION PRICING AND PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION: MOD-
ERN METHODS OF FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS iX (2001) ("There are only a few things in daily
life which are regarded as a better synonym for uncertainty than security prices."); Paul A.
Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41,
42 (1965).
78 See M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 115-16 (1979).
79 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 459 (4th ed.
1977); Danielsson & Shin, supra note 5, at 301.
80 This is true even when the gaming rules favor the house. See RobertJ. Martin, US.
Gaming Operations: The Hospitality Subset of the Future, 6 INT'L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 75, 80
(1987).
81 See ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 10-11, 17-19 (Buttervorth-Heinemann 2d ed. 1995) (1982).
82 See Danielsson & Shin, supra note 5, at 301-02.
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C. Value at Risk
Until the 2007 financial crisis, VaR was widely regarded as the
Stradivarius of risk management tools.8 3 Like many financial risk
measures, 4 VaR relies on the concepts described above-probability,
randomness, and the presumption that portfolio managers, each op-
erating on their own, do not affect market prices.85 VaR's special at-
traction is its ability to sum up a portfolio's market risk-its risk of loss
based on changes in market value-in a single number.8 6 VaR has
many versions, which can vary from firm to firm,8 7 and their risk calcu-
lations may not be identical.8  Nevertheless, the results of each are
closely correlated when using similar parameters, data, and assump-
tions,8 9 and they react in the same way (indicating greater risk) during
periods of high volatility or stress.90
To calculate a portfolio's VaR, a risk manager typically considers
the kinds of risks that affect value, including historical changes in mar-
ket rates and prices and other historical factors.91 She then generates
pro forma estimates of value under those conditions and uses them to
83 See GLYN A. HOLTON, VALUE-AT-RISK: THEORY AND PRACTICE 19 (2003) (noting that
VaR is "not quite a household word" but is familiar to most financial professionals); INT'L
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL MARKET TURBULENCE:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICIES 54 (2007) [hereinafter IMF, TURBULENCE], available
at http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2007/02/pdf/text.pdf (stating that VaR
is "the primary quantitative measure of market risk within most financial institutions");
Markus Leippold, Don't Rely on VaR EUROMONEY, Nov. 2004, at FA2 (stating that the "buzz
phrase" in the financial industry is VaR).
84 For a description of factors contributing to the growth of new risk management
strategies, see KEVIN Down, BEYOND VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW SCIENCE OF RISK MANAGEMENT
5-8 (1998); Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Owner-
ship, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 231, 243-47 (2008).
8'5 SeeJoRuoN, supra note 65, at 79-82, 84-86, 88-89, 98 (describing the basic tools to
measure risk); BENOIT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MAR-
KETS: A FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD 9-11 (2004) (describing theories that
underlie modern financial economics); David Mengle, Risk Management as a Process, in
MODERN RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 3, 5-8 (outlining general characteristics of risk
management processes).
86 See HOLTON, supra note 83, at 22-24; Thomas J. Linsmeier & Neil D. Pearson, Value
at Risk, 56 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 47, 47-48.
87 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 69.
88 SeeJeremy Berkowitz & James O'Brien, How Accurate Are Value-at-Risk Models at Com-
mercial Banks? 5-6 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Div. of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs,
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, No. 2001-31, 2001).
89 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 53; David E. Allen et al., Modelling and Fore-
casting Dynamic VaR Thresholds for Risk Management and Regulation 2-5 (Sch. Accounting,
Fin. & Econ. & FIMARC Working Paper Series, No. 0503, 2005), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=926270.
90 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 53.
9' Appendix A of this Article illustrates how VaR is calculated. See also Darrell Duffie
& Jun Pan, An Overview of Value at Risk, 4J. DERIVATIVES 7, 9-10 (1997) (describing general
tools one must consider when calculating VaR).
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gauge the likelihood and magnitude of future returns. 2 In addition
to measuring market risk, VaR is an important tool used to manage it.
Financial firms regularly impose VaR limits on managers and portfo-
lios. 9 3 Before exceeding a limit, the manager must obtain approval or
reduce the portfolio's exposure, typically by diversifying its holdings94
or reducing their size.95
VaR's ability to distill risk into a single number requires several
simplifying assumptions that can significantly distort results.9 6 Never-
theless, VaR is a cornerstone of global financial regulation.9" Its en-
dorsement by regulators reflects its growing use and sophistication,9 8
which in part resulted from declining costs in developing new VaR
systems.99 VaR also permitted regulators to assess market risk across
firms 00 and to tie regulation to internal measures rather than stan-
dards set by less well-informed outsiders.101 VaR's incorporation into
regulation and best practices included the following:
92 See OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK, 3 GUIDELINES ON MARKET Risic EVALUATION
OF VALUE AT RISK-MODELS 10 (Wolfdietrich Grau ed., 1999) [hereinafter GRAu, VAR-MOD-
ELS], available at http://www.oenb.at/en/img/band3ev40_tcml6-20473.pdf, Linsmeier &
Pearson, supra note 86, at 59.
93 SeeJoRION, supra note 65, at 181-84, 379-87; Suleyman Basak & Alexander Shapiro,
Value-at-Risk-Based Risk Management: Optimal Policies and Asset Prices, 14 REv. FIN. STUD. 371,
371-72 (2001).
94 See HOLTON, supra note 83, at 26-29; JORION, supra note 65, at 163; Barbara Kava-
nagh, A Retrospective Look at Market Risk, in MODERN RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 251,
253-54; see also GRAu, VAR-MODELS, supra note 92, at 3-5 (describing how credit institu-
tions are to comply with various reporting obligations related to each institution's VaR).
For example, due to diversification's benefits, J.P. Morgan's consolidated VaR is substan-
tially lower than the sum of the VaR estimates for each of its trading units. See JoluoN,
supra note 65, at 62. There are, however, questions regarding VaR's ability to fully reflect
the benefits of diversification. See Philippe Artzner et al., Coherent Measures of Risk, 9 MATH-
EMATICAL FIN. 203, 216-18 (1999); Danielsson, supra note 63, at 1289.
95 Appendix A of this Article illustrates VaR's role in policing a portfolio's riskiness.
See alsojoluoN, supra note 65, at 393-95.
96 Appendix A of this Article summarizes some of the key assumptions and resulting
effects on accuracy. A list of VaR's limitations also appears in JoRuoN, supra note 65, at
542-51, and MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 85, at 272-74.
97 SeeJ6n Danielsson et al., Incentives for Effective Risk Management, 26J. BANKING & FIN.
1407, 1408-09 (2002); J6n Danfelsson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Equilibrium Asset Pricing with
Systemic Risk, 35 EcoN. THEORY 293, 294 (2008) (noting that statistical risk models used to
determine bank capital and risk are the "cornerstone" of financial regulation).
98 SeeJORION, supra note 65, at 61 (noting that the surge in banks using their own risk
management models stemmed from recognition that the banks' own risk management
models were more sophisticated than those required by regulators); Markus Leippold et
al., Equilibrium Impact of Value-at-Risk Regulation, 30 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1277,
1278 (2006).
99 See Down, supra note 84, at 20.
100 SeeJose A. Lopez, Regulatory Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models, in THE VALUE-AT-RISK
REFERENCE 455, 458-59 (J6n Danielsson ed., 2007); Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle,
Bank Capital Requirements for Market Risk: The Internal Models Approach, FRBNY EcoN. POL'Y
REv., Dec. 1997, at 1, 8.
101 See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,034, 19,035 (Apr. 19,
1999) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325); Down, supra note 84, at 222.
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* In 1993, the Group of Thirty, Global Derivatives Study Group, en-
dorsed the use of VaR as a best practice by derivatives dealers,102
applicable also to trading in other instruments by other financial
firms; 0 3
* The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision adopted VaR in
1996 as one means for banks to calculate required capital
reserves;O4
* VaR was subsequently included in U.S. risk-based capital require-
ments for commercial banks with significant trading activities1 0 5
and in foreign bank and securities regulations;I0 6
* VaR is used to calculate capital for some of the world's largest
securities firms,107 as well as for over-the-counter derivatives deal-
102 See GROUP OF THIRTY, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES
AND PRINCIPLES 10 (1993) (stating that "[m]arket risk is best measured as 'value at risk'").
103 See HOLTON, supra note 83, at 17.
104 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL Ac-
CORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 44 (1996) [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE, MARKET
RISKS], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf. For a bank that uses VaR, mini-
mum capital is set by reference to the higher of (i) the previous day's VaR measure and (ii)
the average daily VaR measures for each of the preceding sixty business days multiplied by
a factor of three. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 75, at 206; Jose A. Lopez, Methods for Evaluat-
ing Value-at-Risk Estimates, FRBSF ECoN. REV., 1999 No. 2, at 4-5. The multiplier was in-
cluded partly in order to offset potential inaccuracies in a bank's VaR model and partly to
ensure that sufficient levels of capital are set aside. The factor is typically set at three, but
can be increased if later backtesting indicates the bank was overly optimistic in its calcula-
tions. See Hendricks & Hirtle, supra note 100, at 5.
105 See, e.g., Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member Banks; Market Risk Mea-
sure, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. E, § 3(a) (2) (i) (2008) (state member banks); Capital Ade-
quacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies: Market Risk Measure, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225,
app. E, § 3(a) (2) (i) (2008) (bank holding companies).
106 See HOLTON, supra note 83, at 14; see also GRAU, VAR-MODELS, supra note 92, at 3-5
(describing Austrian banking law).
107 Securities firms that were part of a group whose holding company managed risk on
a group-wide basis and that consented to group-wide Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) supervision were eligible to compute capital charges using an alternative formula
that incorporates VaR. See Rules 15c3-1 (a) (7), 15c3-le(d), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1 (a) (7),
240.15c3-le(d) (2005). The five firms that adopted the alternative calculation (Bear
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) are either
no longer independent companies or have become bank holding companies subject to
FRB oversight. See John C. Coffee Jr., Analyzing the Credit Crisis: Was the SEC Missing in
Action, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202426
495544. All five or their successors, however, continue to rely on Rule 15c3-le to compute
regulatory capital for SEC purposes. See, e.g., The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the Period Ended Mar. 31, 2010, at 73 (filed May 10, 2010);
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the Period Ended June 30,
2010, at 63 (filed Aug. 6, 2010) (after acquiring Bear Stearns); Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the Period Ended June 30, 2010, at 77 (filed Aug. 6,
2010) (after being acquired by Bank of America); Morgan Stanley, Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q for the Period EndedJune 30, 2010, at 70 (filed Aug. 6, 2010). Lehman Broth-
ers was acquired by Barclays Capital, a non-U.S. financial services firm, which obtained
temporary relief from the SEC to continue to calculate capital charges pursuant to Rule
15c3-le for the Lehman Brothers positions it purchased. See Order Granting Temporary,
Conditional Relief from the Net Capital Rule for Barclays Capital, Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 58612, 94 S.E.C. Docket 9813 (Sept. 22, 2008).
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ers. 08 VaR can also be used to calculate capital for investment
bank holding companies that meet specified criteria;'
* VaR is one of three options available to public firms in disclosing
their market risk exposures;o10 and
* The European Union has incorporated VaR into new capital re-
quirements for insurance and reinsurance companies, anticipated
to be in place by October 2012.111
In addition, VaR has been important for credit rating agencies,
which considered VaR to be a best practice among financial firms
when assessing their credit quality"12 and used VaR to calculate the
amount of equity capital a bank must hold.' 1 3 A firm's credit rating
can directly affect its cost of capital, thereby providing the firm with a
powerful incentive to adopt VaR measures.11 4 Investors also required
hedge funds to use VaR-based technology, prompting the hedge fund
industry to incorporate VaR as a best practice." 5
108 See Rule 15c3-lf(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lf(e) (2008); see also OTC Derivatives
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40594, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,366, 59,367 (Nov. 3, 1998)
[hereinafter OTC Derivatives Dealers].
109 See Rules 17i-1-17i-8, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17i-1-17i-8 (2008).
110 See Regulation S-K, Item 305(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 229.305(a)(1) (2008). VaR disclo-
sures are generally helpful in assessing risk and prospective variability in revenues. See
Philippe Jorion, How Informative Are Value-at-Risk Disclosures, 77 Accr. REv. 911, 912
(2002). There are, however, notable exceptions, such as Enron's failure to assess its deriva-
tives exposures. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View ofEnron and the Sudden Death of "May,"
48 VILL. L. REv. 1245, 1259-60 (2003).
1II See European Commission, Internal Markets & Services DG, "Solvency II": Fre-
quently Asked Questions (FAQs) 1, 3-4 (Apr. 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/in-
ternal market/insurance/docs/solvency/solvency2/faq-en.pdf.
112 See, e.g., STANDARD & PooR's, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT FOR FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS: RATING CRITERIA AND BEST PRACTICEs 18 (2005) [hereinafter S&P, ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT], available at http://mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/documents/sp-erm-busdevbk.pdf
("Standard & Poor's considers VaR calculations to be good discipline for robust risk man-
agement practices and believes that the 'spillover' effects of the risk systems required to
run these models are beneficial in many respects.").
11 SeeJoluoN, supra note 65, at 404-07.
114 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 688-90, 698-700 (1999) (describing restric-
tions on the purchase of debt with lower credit ratings that result in part in an increase in
the cost of commercial paper by lower-grade issuers).
115 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 69-70; MANAGED FUNDS Ass'N, SOUND PRAC-
TICES FOR HEDGE FUND MANAGERS, at app. III 7-15 (2009), available at http://www.man-
agedfunds.org/files/pdfs/MFA SoundPractices_2009.pdf.
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VaR's limitations are well-known to regulators' 16 and risk manag-
ers.' 17  Firms, therefore, supplement VaR with simulations ("stress
tests") that, in theory, reflect a portfolio's individual risks.11 8 In prac-
tice, however, stress tests have become more uniform. Risk managers
use stress scenarios from prior employers,' 19 while regulators coordi-
nate tests in order to assess risk across different firms.1 20 Standard &
Poor's has also identified "commonly run" historical stress tests that it
expects all financial firms to include in risk assessments.121 Conse-
quently, rather than individualizing risk, stress tests have reinforced
uniformity in portfolio management. 2 2
116 See, e.g., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR SECURITIES REGULATORS OF THE INCREASED USE OF VALUE AT RISK MODELS BY SECURITIES
FIRMS 6 (1995), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD46.pdf
("[VaR is] based on observed statistical relationships which are of varying levels of reliabil-
ity. [VaR is] also heavily dependent on the assumptions which the model builders make
about the relationships between different financial instruments [and] the observation peri-
ods over which the relationships are estimated.").
117 See Michael C. Macchiarola, Beware of Risk Everywhere: An Important Lesson from the
Current Credit Crisis, 5 HAsTiNGs Bus. L.J. 267, 286, 294-97 (2009).
118 SeeJORION, supra note 65, at 357; Linsmeier & Pearson, supra note 86, at 60-61; Karl
S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REv. 183, 214-15
(2009).
119 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 69.
120 The Basel Committee, for example, has identified several scenarios to include in
each bank's testing regimen. See BASEL COMMITTEE, MARKET RISKS, supra note 104, at
46-47; OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK, 5 GUIDELINES ON MARKET Risic STRESS TESTING
21 (Wolfdietrich Grau ed., 1999) [hereinafter GRAu, STRESS TESTING], available at http://
www.oenb.at/en/img/band5ev4Otcml6-20475.pdf; see also BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 26
(2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl44.pdf (providing illustrative list of sce-
narios to include in stress tests of a bank's funding and market liquidity exposures). Banks
also incorporate risk factors from a 1995 report prepared by the Derivatives Policy Group,
an industry organization comprised of U.S. banks and broker-dealers. See GRAu, STRESS
TESTING, supra, at 16-17. Other regulators, as well, have moved towards standardized test-
ing. See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 56-57, 70; see also GRAu, STRESS TESTING, SUPra,
at 16. The Austrian bank regulator, for example, has published tables of maximum
changes in individual risk factors to be included in stress tests, even though they are "not
meant as a recipe." GRAU, STRESS TESTING, supra, at 27-32. The SEC also requires each
over-the-counter derivatives dealer to perform stress tests that reflect changes in specified
pricing and volatility categories. See Rule 15c3-lf(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lf(e) (2008); see
also OTC Derivatives Dealers, supra note 108, at 59386 n.244 (listing stress tests to be ap-
plied). Perhaps the most well-known example of market-wide stress testing was the Obama
Administration's review of the nineteen largest U.S. financial institutions in early 2009. See
Rob Cox & Richard Beales, Stress Tests Prove a Sobering Idea, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at B2.
121 See S&P, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 112, at 28.
122 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PINCIPLES FOR SOUND STREss TEsT-
ING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 13-21 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs
155.pdf; SENIOR SUPERVISORS GP., OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES DURING
THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE 16-17 (2008) [hereinafter SENIOR SUPERVISORS], available
at www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/SSG_Risk Mgtdocfinal.pdf- Barry
Eichengreen, Ten Questions About the Subprime Crisis, FIN. STABILTY REv., Feb. 2008, at 19,
22.
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The result is a conflict-the uniform application of a risk mea-
sure that presumes independence and randomness. Regulation, and
its incorporation into best practices, has largely fuelled VaR's growth
as an industry standard. 123 Its success, however, raises an intriguing
question: What happens, in a world premised on randomness, when
financial market participants assess risk in the same way? More gener-
ally, how are the markets affected when their principal actors begin to
act in unison? The next Part begins to consider these questions.
II
COORDINATION IN A RANDOM WouD
Coordination's costs must begin to be balanced against its bene-
fits. Identifying those costs, however, can be difficult. In this Part, I
provide examples of the potentially destructive effect of coordination
in the financial markets. VaR's incorporation into regulation, and its
use in market standards, can create greater market volatility. Addi-
tional examples include the Bear Stearns meltdown, growing stand-
ardization in the derivatives market, and the growth of common
technology systems.
A. A Paradox
Coordination's benefits are well-known in the financial markets.
Regulation-like the Basel Accord-promotes market stability in part
by leveling the playing field.124 Likewise, market standards-like the
CSA-help lower transaction costs, in part by minimizing the need for
extensive negotiation.125 In each case, the results are coordinated
outcomes that, on balance, benefit market participants.
Coordination can also be costly, and those costs are often less
well-understood than the accompanying benefits. Regulation and
standards typically center on individual firms that are each considered
separately.126 Capital regulation, for example, supports market stabil-
ity by limiting each bank's risk taking, and standard-form contracts
bind only the parties to each agreement. Yet, both also promote uni-
formity across the financial markets. Capital regulation encourages
123 See Basak & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 371 (describing VaR as "the industry standard
by choice or by regulation").
124 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
126 See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REG-
ULATION 2-3 (Geneva Reports on the World Economy, Preliminary Conference Draft,
2009), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-markus/research/papers/Geneval 1l.pdf;
ANDREW CROCKETT, MARRYING TIE MICRO- AND MACRO-PRUDENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF FINAN-
CIAL STABILITY 3 (2000), available at http://www.bis.org/review/rr000921b.pdf (noting the
quintessential micro-prudential dictum ... that 'financial stability is ensured as long as
each and every institution is sound'" (emphasis omitted)).
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banks to assess market risk using similar tools, like VaR, and standard-
form contracts cause different firms to comply with like provisions in
the same way. Managers, consequently, react to events in unison-
each acting individually but, as a group, influencing asset prices and
affecting the trading decisions of others.
The result is a paradox-regulation and standards that promote
coordination can erode risk management tools premised on random-
ness and independent action'2 7 and alter the dynamics that make risk
management effective.12 8 In those cases, coordination's costs can be-
gin to outweigh its benefits. 2 9
A good illustration of this paradox is VaR and its use in regulation
and market standards. Recall that VaR presumes that portfolio man-
agers act independently and a manager's trading decisions do not af-
fect market prices.13 0 Yet, VaR's incorporation into regulation, and its
use as a standard, can promote greater uniformity. Managers, in that
case, continue to work separately, but now a decision to buy or sell
assets is more likely to be replicated by others using the same risk
measure. The resulting sales (purchases) can exacerbate a decline
(rise) in price and prompt further trading as managers adjust and
readjust their portfolios.13 1 Diagram 2 illustrates the feedback effects,
assuming an initial drop in price. I describe each step below:
Box 1-A drop in asset price increases market volatility and, in
turn, the VaR level of a bank or other financial firm subject to
VaR-based capital regulation, thereby raising the amount of capi-
tal each bank or financial firm must set aside. Financial institu-
tions also use short-term repo trades-economically similar to
127 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 61; Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Risk
Management with Interdependent Choice, 15 OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y, Autumn 1999, at
52-53. This paradox is sometimes referred to as Goodhart's Law which, modified for fi-
nancial regulation, states that the statistical relationships underlying a risk model will break
down when the model is used for regulatory purposes. See Danielsson, supra note 63, at
1276. Goodhart's Law originated with Charles Goodhart, who first applied the analysis to
the relationship between interest rates and monetary policy. Others have extended it to
additional statistical relationships. See K. Alec Chrystal & Paul D. Mizen, Goodhart's Law:
Its Origins, Meaning and Implications for Monetary Policy 2-4, 16 (Nov. 12, 2001) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://cyberlibris.typepad.com/blog/files/Goodharts
Law.pdf.
128 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 62-63.
129 See Morris & Shin, supra note 127, at 55-57, 59.
130 See supra notes 62-64, 84-85 and accompanying text.
131 SeeJ6n Danielsson et al., The Impact of Risk Regulation on Price Dynamics, 28 J. BANK-
ING & FIN. 1069, 1070-71 (2004); Danfelsson & Zigrand, supra note 97, at 310-11. This
may be true even across portfolios of different securities. A downturn in one portfolio,
through its impact on market liquidity, can have a negative spillover effect on others, even
if the portfolios are subject to different management styles. See Nicole M. Boyson et al.,
Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity Shocks, 65 J. FIN. 1789, 1789-92 (2010).
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secured loans-to finance investments. 1 3 2  In a repo trade, a
lender extends credit based on collateral, which it may discount
(a "haircut") below market value.' 3 3 Using a simple example, if a
haircut is 3%, a firm can borrow $97 million for each $100 mil-
lion in collateral it pledges; the firm must use its own capital to
finance the remaining $3 million. Repo creditors regularly use
VaR to determine collateral (and haircut) requirements, with in-
creases in VaR resulting in a larger haircut.1 34
DIAGRAM 2: VAR's FEEDBACK EFFECTS
Sale of (3 Adverse Price
(Other) Assets Move (4)
Capital/Collateral/ VaR
VaR Limits (2)
VaR Capital/Collateral!
VaR Limits (6)
Adverse Price Sale of (7)
Move (8) (Other) Assets
* Box 2-After VaR increases, each firm must raise new capital in
order to meet its regulatory obligations and, if the assets were
used as collateral, to make up the gap resulting from the larger
haircut.' 3 5 The amounts can be substantial. For example, ac-
132 See Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding
Liquidity, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2201, 2202 (2009); Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did Fair-
Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis? 10 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper Series in Finance, Working Paper No. 266, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1487905. In a typical sale and repurchase (also known
as "repo") transaction, a securities dealer (the "repo seller") sells securities to an investor
(the "repo buyer") for cash. The repo buyer's objective is not to invest in the securities;
rather, it expects to receive a return from the repo seller for the use of its cash. Accord-
ingly, as part of the trade, the repo seller also agrees with the repo buyer to repurchase the
same or equivalent securities at some future time, frequently overnight, at a repurchase
price above the price at which the repo buyer first bought the securities. Economically, the
transaction is equivalent to a secured loan-with the repo buyer lending cash to the repo
seller against the underlying securities as collateral. SeeJeanne L. Schroeder, A Repo Opera:
How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backwards, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 565, 570-72 (2002).
133 See GARY GORTON, SLAPPED IN THE FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE
PANIC OF 2007, at 44 (2010).
134 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 126, at 18-19; IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note
83, at 53, 70; Brunnermeier & Pedersen, supra note 132, at 2202.
135 See GORTON, supra note 133, at 47-50; IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 62;
Whitehead, supra note 13, at 22-23.
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cording to one analyst's estimates, the repo market is between $8
and $10 trillion in size.1 3 6 Although market-wide data is unavaila-
ble, haircuts on structured debt rose between 2% and 35% during
the recent financial crisis, with creditors refusing to accept some
instruments (like subprime mortgage assets) altogether.13 7 If
haircuts rose only 5% on average, borrowers would need to raise a
total of $400 to $500 billion in new capital.
* Box 3-In order to raise new capital, the firm must issue equity or
sell assets. New shares, in a volatile market, are likely to suffer
from the well-known "lemons effect" as prospective investors with
imperfect information discount their value.' 3 8 Consequently, the
firm will be motivated to sell assets in order to raise cash.' 3 9 The
higher cost of collateral (the larger haircuts) can also force it to
downsize its financing arrangements. 140 In addition, individual
traders may need to adjust their portfolios-perhaps by selling
assets-in order to remain below their VaR limits. 14 1
* Box 4-The result, in each case, is a greater pressure to sell assets,
which when replicated among portfolio managers, causes a fur-
ther drop in price. 14 2
* Box 5-Declining prices cause greater market volatility' 4 3 and,
like in Box 1, prompt a further increase in VaR. Assets in a falling
market can also become more correlated,14 4 making it more diffi-
136 GoRTON, supra note 133, at 50.
137 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, The Run on Repo and the Panic of 2007-2008,
at 29-33 (Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://econ-www.mit.
edu/files/3918.
138 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488, 489-92 (1970); Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informa-
tion Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 371-72
(1977).
139 See Albert S. Kyle & Wei Xiong, Contagion as a Wealth Effect, 56 J. FIN. 1401, 1402,
1427 (2001).
140 See GORTON, supra note 133, at 50; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 137, at 30.
141 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 61-62; Danfelsson & Zigrand, supra note 97,
at 302. In addition, traders who suffer losses may simply choose to sell assets in order to
minimize the risk of any future decline. See Kyle & Xiong, supra note 139, at 1402.
142 The Risks of Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight, H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 110th Cong. 5-6
(2009) (statement of Richard Bookstaber) [hereinafter Bookstaber Testimony], available at
http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2009/Oversight/
10sep/BookstaberTestimony.pdf.
143 See Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital Regulation 13-14 (Aug. 2008) (un-
published working paper), available at http://www.davidson.edu/academic/economics/
kumar/Eco%20495/Spring%202009/KashyapRajanStein.09.15.08.pdf.
144 See Danielsson & Zigrand, supra note 97, at 296, 308; Kyle & Xiong, supra note 139,
at 1401-05; see also Mico Loretan & William B. English, Evaluating "Correlation Breakdowns"
During Peiods of Market Volatility 1-3 (Fed. Reserve Sys., Int'l Fin. Discussion Papers, No.
658, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2000/658/ifdp658.pdf
(finding increased correlation in asset returns when markets become volatile).
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cult for firms to diversify risk14 5 and creating a further rise in
VaR.14 6
* Boxes 6-8--Increased VaR, in turn, creates additional pressure to
raise or maintain capital (Box 6), causing further asset sales (Box
7) and another drop in price (Box 8) as portfolio managers again
look to raise cash and manage their exposures. The resulting
growth in volatility can prompt another increase in VaR, re-
starting the cycle as firms continue to respond to risk in the same
way.147
Coordination, as Diagram 2 illustrates, can undermine risk man-
agement's effectiveness. A specific event-like a drop in price-can
spark a common response, similar to what happens when there is
herding. Recall that herding occurs if managers mimic the actions of
others rather than risk incurring losses on their own.148 If each acts
separately, some responses (to hold or buy) are likely to offset others
(to sell) and vice versa. The result, when reactions are mixed, is less
pressure to herd. Greater uniformity has an opposite effect: as more
managers respond in the same way, others will follow rather than risk
standing alone, which in turn increases the pressure to herd. A man-
ager, for example, may be unwilling to ignore a rise in VaR if she
believes others using the same risk measure have adjusted their port-
folios in response to this change, 149 even though risk managers often
claim that firms can use discretion when responding to shifts in
VaR.150 It may be particularly difficult for her to disregard a "risky"
VaR, in light of its widespread use, even if she later becomes aware of
new (or contradictory) information.s1 5  The tendency is reinforced by
145 See Danfelsson & Zigrand, supra note 97, at 307; William N. Goetzmann et al., Long-
Term Global Market Correlations, 78 J. Bus. 1, 3 (2005).
146 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 60.
147 See Morris & Shin, supra note 127, at 52-53 (noting how the coordinated actions of
financial institutions during volatile times in the market led to "exaggerated price move-
ments and the drying up of liquidity even in the most widely traded instruments").
148 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
149 See Avinash Persaud, Sending the Herd off the Cliff Edge: The Disturbing Interaction Be-
tween Herding and Market-Sensitive Risk Management Practices, 2 J. RISK FIN. 59, 61-63 (2000);
Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 22, at 465-66 (noting that "an unprofitable decision is not
as bad for reputation when others make the same mistake"); see also IMF, TURBULENCE,
supra note 83, at 71 (explaining that portfolio managers may adjust portfolios in light of
greater volatility, rather than risk explaining to regulators why they exceeded their VaR
limits).
150 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 53, 54, 70; JORION, supra note 65, at 397;
S&P, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 112, at 22-23; see also Danfelsson, supra
note 63, at 1283-84 (suggesting anecdotally that firms smooth risk forecasts rather than
strictly adhere to VaR).
151 See Chris Guthrie, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 787-89 (2001) (describing the psychological process of
"anchoring").
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VaR models that generally react in the same way-signaling greater
risk when there is a downturn in the market.15 2
A similar effect is found in the bank credit markets. Recall that
global capital regulation was introduced to harmonize banking stan-
dards. Each bank is required to set aside capital-calculated, in part,
using VaR-as a safety cushion against future losses in order to ensure
the bank's continued solvency.' 5 3 The result, however, has been an
increase in the procyclicality of the credit markets.154 When the econ-
omy is strong, a borrower's default risk is likely to be remote, minimiz-
ing the amount of capital each bank must set aside against prospective
loss. When the economy sours, however, risk-based requirements can
put pressure on each bank to strengthen its capital cushion, reducing
its incentive to lend and, in aggregate, increasing economic instability.
Like pedestrians on the Millennium Bridge, each bank acts indepen-
dently, but in total, the amount of available credit increases during
upturns in the economy and tightens when the economy slows. 15 5
As VaR illustrates, coordination-reinforced by regulation and
standards-can create negative externalities. With herding, for exam-
ple, a portfolio manager's decision to go with the herd imposes a cost
152 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. In addition, medium and smaller
firms are likely to use the same "off-the-shelf" risk management packages, which will all
show similar changes in VaR. See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 69.
153 See Kashyap et al., supra note 143, at 12, 16-18; Whitehead, supra note 13, at 25,
39-40.
154 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY RE-
FORM 26 (2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regula-
toryreform.pdf (recommending countercyclical capital requirements because the
procyclicality of existing capital requirements "likely intensifies the ups and downs in asset
markets").
155 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 126, at 14-15; George G. Pennacchi, Risk-Based
Capital Standards, Deposit Insurance, and Procyclicality, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 432, 433
(2005); Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation
2 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www.cemfi.es/-suarez/
repullo-suarez09.pdf. Fair value accounting can contribute to the procyclical effect of
bank capital regulation. See Alicia Novoa et al., Procyclicality and Fair Value Accounting 7-12
(Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/09/39, 2009), available at www.bis.org/
bcbs/events/cbrworkshop09/novoascarlatasole.pdf. A downturn in the markets may make
it difficult to value complex products. See Charles Smithson, Valuing "Hard-to-Value" Assets
and Liabilities: Notes on Valuing Structured Credit Products, 19 J. APPLIED FIN. 1, 5 (2009). If
market conditions cause a decline in the value of bank assets, banks may be required to
increase loan loss provisioning, prompting a reduction in lending that, in turn, results in a
further slowdown in the real economy. See Anne Beatty & Scott Liao, Regulatory Capital
Ratios, Loan Loss Provisioning and Pro-Cyclicality 5-6 (Oct. 15, 2009) (unpublished work-
ing paper), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/accounting/papers/beatty.
pdf. After they recognize losses, banks may also be forced to sell assets in illiquid markets
to raise capital, further weakening the markets, reducing price, and compelling additional
sales. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, Div. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANCE COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: STUDY ON MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNT-
ING 182-84 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarketl2
3008.pdf.
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on others, who are now marginally more inclined to follow her lead
rather than act on their own. 15 6 VaR-based regulation magnifies that
tendency by creating greater pressure to buy or sell. 15 7 Thus, ironi-
cally, unregulated firms may be better able to manage their financial
risks than firms that are subject to enhanced risk regulation.1 58 Like-
wise, a market standard, like the CSA, can cause managers who com-
ply with its terms to respond to the same event in the same way.15 9 A
manager who signs a CSA is likely motivated by its benefit of reduced
transaction costs without being aware of its potential costs. In both
cases, the results are increased externalities that may not be readily
apparent to market participants.
B. Some Examples of Destructive Coordination
Below are three examples of coordination's costly effects. The
first example ties the use of VaR to a recent real-world problem, in-
volving Bear Stearns, during the recent financial crisis. The second
example illustrates how a market standard, like the CSA, can create
greater uniformity and thereby increase market volatility. The last ex-
ample describes how technology systems that standardize responses to
specific events can reinforce the uniformity created by regulation and
market standards.
1. Bear Stearns
In many respects, Bear Stearns's meltdown in spring 2008 was
similar to a bank run, but one involving a securities firm-not a
bank-many of whose investors were sophisticated institutions.160
Like many firms, Bear Stearns relied on short-term repo trades to fi-
156 See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798-99
(1992).
157 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 54, 72-73; Morris & Shin, supra note 127, at
59.
158 Hedge funds, for example, were not as adversely affected as banks during the re-
cent financial crisis partly because they were not subject to capital regulations that, like
with banks, would have caused them to hold risky subprime mortgage assets. See
RAGHURAM G. RAjAN, FAULT LINEs: How HIDDEN FRACTuREs STILL THREATEN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 178 (2010).
159 An example of the CSA's impact on asset prices appears infra at notes 170-184 and
accompanying text.
160 See GORTON, supra note 133, at 45-54. Bear Steams was not the first example of a
bank run on a securities firm. Drexel Burnham declared bankruptcy in 1990 after the
collapse of the secondary market for high-yield bonds. Securities that traded freely be-
came illiquid following Michael Milken's six felony convictions, changes in regulation re-
quiring thrifts to sell their holdings, and a collapse in confidence over the value of high-
yield instruments; the result was, like in the case of Bear Stearns, an increased cost of
borrowing that forced Drexel Burnham to liquidate its assets at fire sale prices. See Frank-
lin Allen & Richard Herring, Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation 28-34
(Wharton Fin. Inst. Center, Working Paper No. 01-29, 2001), available at http://knowl-
edge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/ 1174.pdf.
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nance its holdings, including subprime mortgage assets16 whose value
began to decline as housing prices plummeted, default rates esca-
lated, and investors came to realize that underwriting standards had
eroded.162 Following the drop in value, Bear Stearns's creditors re-
quired the firm to post additional (or substitute) collateral and, in
some cases, refused to roll over or extend credit altogether. These
new requirements effectively forced Bear Steams to sell assets quickly,
often at fire-sale prices. 163 The resulting drop in value affected the
prices and volatility of similar assets held by others, transmitting Bear
Stearns's problems across the market. Additional sales pushed the
prices of Bear Steams's assets even lower, increasing volatility and cre-
ating even greater pressure to sell. 164
On its face, the Bear Steams example appears similar to the feed-
back loop illustrated in Diagram 2. To be sure, the price decline may
have simply reflected the natural tendencies of firms to sell risky as-
sets165 and creditors to demand additional collateral when the finan-
cial markets fall.166 The speed of the decline may have also reflected
the significant risks that Bear Stearns incurred-risks that only be-
came evident when the markets slowed.' 67 Thus, neither VaR nor any
other risk management strategy is likely to be the sole cause of a drop
in asset prices. What is clear, however, is that the uniformity of re-
sponse was unanticipated-it was neither reflected in the risk manage-
ment systems nor considered by regulators or market participants.
VaR's widespread use helped reinforce the downward spiral in part by
supporting greater uniformity among portfolio managers. 6 8
2. Credit Support Annex
Credit default swaps (CDS) transfer the risk of credit loss, usually
in connection with a referenced asset or entity, from one swap
counterparty to another. Under a typical CDS, the beneficiary pays a
premium to the credit risk holder (the "protection seller") who agrees
to pay the beneficiary an amount that reflects the decline in value of
the referenced asset upon the occurrence of a credit event (such as a
161 See Whitehead, supra note 13, at 22-23; see also supra notes 132-34 and accompany-
ing text (describing short-term repo trades).
162 See Laux & Leuz, supra note 132, at 11.
163 See id. at 12-14; see also Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycles and the Anx-
ious Economy, 98 Am. ECON. REv. 1211, 1238 (2008) (describing "flight to collateral," where
investors sell assets that cannot be used as collateral and buy assets that can be pledged to
lenders at lower cost).
164 See Whitehead, supra note 13, at 22-23.
165 See IMF, TURBULENCE, supra note 83, at 53.
166 See Fostel & Geanakoplos, supra note 163, at 1214-15.
167 See Okamoto, supra note 118, at 189 (arguing that the root cause of the financial
crisis was excessive risk taking by asset managers that remained unchecked).
168 See Romano, supra note 27, at 15-16.
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default or failure to pay).' 69 CDS typically rely on ISDA documents,
including the CSA. 170
Under the CSA, banks and other protection sellers are required
to post collateral depending on their prospective payment obligations.
For hedge funds, as pledgors, the typical requirement is that they post
collateral for 100% of their potential obligation, and in some cases,
the CSA may require that they post additional collateral as a buffer
against the risk of future default.171
As it has for swaps generally, the use of standard language has
reduced transaction costs and expanded the scope of the CDS mar-
ket.17 2 Likewise, the CSA lowered the cost to swaps dealers of enter-
ing into contracts with new counterparties. In 1994, when the CSA
was introduced, the principal swaps dealers managed approximately
169 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 947-50
(2009).
170 See BARcL.Ys CAPITAL, COUNTERPARTY RISK IN CREDIT MARKETS: QUANTITATIVE
CREDIT STRATEGY RESEARCH REPORT 3 (2008), available at https://ecommerce.barcap.com/
research/user/article/attachment/hj20938relin8pbiedmg/0/Counterparty%20Risk%20-
%2020%2OFeb%2008.pdf.
171 See id. The CSA requires the party with a swap payment obligation (the "pledgor")
to transfer collateral to the counterparty with the net credit exposure (the "secured party")
in order to minimize credit risk. Mechanically, the secured party must calculate the
amount it is entitled to receive and then notify the pledgor by a pre-agreed time. The
pledgor must then post the collateral with (or for the account of) the secured party by the
close of business on the next business day. See CSA, supra note 55, at paras. 3, 4(b), 4(c),
13(c); see also Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives and Rehypothecation Failure: It's 3:00 p.m., Do
You Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 39 ARJz. L. REV. 949, 957-58 (1997) (describing various
standardized documents prepared by ISDA for use in CDS transactions).
172 See Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 184-88
(2007); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1019, 1025-26 (2007). Perhaps the clearest example of coordination in the
swaps markets is just beginning to become evident-namely, the fallout from litigation
arising from the financial crisis. A court's interpretation of a CDS's terms in one jurisdic-
tion may have market-wide impact due to their standardized and widespread use. Firms
that were never parties to the original lawsuit but use the same CDS form may be directly
affected. SeeJeffrey B. Golden, The Courts, The Financial Crisis and Systemic Risk, 4 CAPITAL
MKTs. L.J. S141, S144-46 (2009). The U.S. federal courts have recognized a similar rela-
tionship in standard-form indenture provisions, noting that "[b]oilerplate provisions are
thus not the consequence of the relationship of particular borrowers and lenders and do
not depend upon particularized intentions of the parties to an indenture." Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1012 (1983). Perhaps the most recent example is found in Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and
Chemicals, Inc., No. 649, 2010 (Del. Nov. 23, 2010), where the Delaware Supreme Court
was asked to interpret a standardized charter provision involving the election of directors
to a staggered board. The Court described the widespread use of identical language
among firms incorporated in Delaware, id., slip op. at 15-16, and the use of similar lan-
guage in the ABA's model incorporation forms, id., slip op. at 17-18, finding them to be
"overwhelming and uncontroverted extrinsic evidence" of the meaning of the Airgas provi-
sion, id., slip op. at 22. Adopting a different meaning would have affected some of Dela-
ware's largest corporations, prompting the Court to note it could not "ignore [the]
widespread corporate practice and understanding it represents." Id, slip op. at 16.
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$4.7 billion in collateral.17 3  Privately negotiated support arrange-
ments involved significant time and expense to structure and negoti-
ate.174 As a result, the major swaps dealers concentrated their
business on firms that had investment-grade credit ratings.'7 5 The
CSA streamlined the credit process. At the end of 2008, collateral
deposited under CSAs totaled about $4 trillion, an 850-fold increase
over 1994-with approximately 65% of all derivatives being subject to
CSAs or other collateral arrangements.1 7 6 Approximately 50% of
CSAs involve hedge funds and institutional investors, followed by cor-
porations, banks, and others.1 7 7
A rise in the cost of a CDS above the protection seller's premium
often indicates a greater probability that a credit event will occur, in
turn requiring the protection seller to post additional collateral.17 8
CDS costs surged following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008, reflecting market-wide concern over the stability of
other firms.179 The result was a significant increase in the amount of
collateral that protection sellers were required to post. The CSA form
leaves open how often a CDS is revalued and, reflecting any increase
or decrease in value, how often collateral ("variation margin") is pro-
vided or returned180 (referred to as "marking-to-market"' 81). CDS
counterparties, however, typically agree that the seller's obligations
will be marked-to-market on a daily basis, transferring collateral back
and forth between them depending on the net increase or decrease in
the value of the CDS. 182 Following the Lehman Brothers collapse,
protection sellers (many of them hedge funds) were required to post
a significant amount of additional collateral within a single day, total-
ing $140 billion across the industry. To raise money, they sold other
173 See U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: Ac-
TIONs NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 58, 156 (1994).
174 See Nina Hval, Credit Risk Reduction in the International Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Market: Collateralizing the Net Exposure with Support Agreements, 31 INT'L LAw. 801, 809 (1997).
175 See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation,
55 MD. L. REv. 1, 51 (1996).
176 See ISDA, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2009, at 3, 7 (2009), available at http://www.isda.
org/c-and -a/pdf/ISDA-Margin-Survey-2009.pdf.
177 See id. at 8.
178 See Sjostrom, supra note 169, at 951.
179 See Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 13-14 (Oct. 6, 2008) (statement of Prof. Luigi
Zingales, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business).
180 See CSA, supra note 55, at para. 13(c).
181 See VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 594 F. Supp. 2d
334, 338 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), affd, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 26621 (2d Cir. 2009).
182 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADM'R OF NAT'L BANKs, OCC's QUARTERLY RE-
PORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: THIRD QUARTER 2008, at 5 (2008)
available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/deriva-
tives/dq408.pdf; RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRAIA, FINANCIAL STABILIrY REVIEW 69 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2009/mar/pdf/0309.pdf.
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assets in unison, contributing to a substantial decline in securities
prices around the world.183
Protection sellers, in the absence of a CSA, would likely still have
been required to post collateral. Creation of the CSA, however, signif-
icantly increased the amount of collateral used by market participants
and, like VaR-based regulation, promoted uniformity in the deriva-
tives markets. Standard provisions in the CSA caused protection sell-
ers to react to the increase in CDS prices in the same way and at
roughly the same time, simultaneously driving prices lower, which in
turn required additional sales to raise further funds.18 4
3. Technology Systems
The third example highlights a growing area of standardization
that is likely to increase uniformity in the financial markets. As regula-
tory requirements have grown, so too have the costs of compliance
and reporting. One response has been the growth of technology sys-
tems in the risk management area to quantify and report the financial
risks to which a firm is subject. Those systems include decision con-
trols that automate business rules intended to mitigate risk consistent
with operational and regulatory requirements.1 8 5
Creating a compliance system can be expensive. As a result, ven-
dors have developed comprehensive risk management packages-fre-
quently out-of-the-box systems based on the vendors' understanding
of industry best practices that firms can directly implement. Relying
on third-party vendors lowers costs and provides users with some level
of comfort that their approach to compliance is consistent with the
approach taken by others.186
Perhaps the best-known example of technology's impact on the
financial markets is the feedback loop-triggered by "portfolio insur-
ance"-that helped fuel the Black Monday crash of 1987.187 Portfolio
insurance involved the computer trading of common stock using a
program that automatically executed orders to sell shares when prices
fell to prespecified levels. Institutional investors intended to
183 See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman's Demise Tiggered Cash Crunch Around Globe,
WA.L ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at Al.
184 One casualty was American International Group, whose subsidiary was required to
post $6.0 billion of additional collateral when securities prices were declining, making it
incrementally more difficult for it to meet its CSA obligations. See Sjostrom, supra note
169, at 960-61, 962-63, 977-83.
185 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital
Age, 88 TEX. L. REv. 669, 685-87, 689-92 (2010).
186 See id. at 692-93.
187 See Mark Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the
Federal Reserve Response 15-16 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, No. 2007-
13, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200 7 13/200713abs.
html.
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rebalance a stock portfolio between risky and less risky investments so
that its return would not drop below a targeted minimum. Using a
computer program, they would automatically sell shares if they
reached a trigger price, reducing exposure to a falling market.188
Black Monday followed a sustained bull market, during which stock
prices had risen substantially. Changing perceptions, prompted by
concern about overvalued stocks, caused some investors to sell shares,
starting a decline in price that triggered selling under some portfolio
insurance programs. Those sales sparked a further decline and addi-
tional sales as shares reached new price levels, fueling a downward
spiral. Large trades were automatically executed without regard to
the unusual circumstances.189 Other investors-including those who
anticipated further computer-driven sales-sold their portfolios, cre-
ating even greater downward pressure on price.190 The result was the
greatest stock market collapse (at the time) since the 1929 crash, with
the Dow Jones Industrial Average losing over 20% of its value in a
single day.' 9 '
Black Monday is an extreme example; the role of technology sys-
tems today is more subtle, but still as important. 92 Lawrence Lessig
famously observed that "code is law."' 93 In that respect, systems that
implement compliance regimes can have the force of law, telling port-
folio managers what they can and cannot do.194 Like regulation, they
can promote uniformity among different firms, each of which has pur-
chased or developed a similar risk management system, potentially
reinforcing the cascade effect of a downturn in asset prices.195
188 See Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public
Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 191, 200-01, 210-13 (1988).
189 SeeJerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The
United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 CEO. L.J. 1993, 2007-11 (1988); Solomon &
Dicker, supra note 188, at 222-28.
190 SeeJonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of
Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007, 1028-30
(1990).
191 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 1 (1988).
192 Recall that the May 2010 "flash crash" was also prompted by technology-based trad-
ing programs. See supra note 28.
193 LAWRENCE LEssiG, CoDE: VvsioN 2.0, at 5 (2006).
194 See Lawrence Lessig, Foreword, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987, 990 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV.
553, 565, 568-69 (1998) (noting the role of network technology in imposing a "parallel
rule system" on participants).
195 See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regula-
tion to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REv. 127, 184-85 (2009).
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III
BALANCING COSTS AND BENEFITS
So, if financial regulation can increase systemic risk, why not sim-
ply do away with it altogether? In part, regulation helps minimize
costs, 196 notwithstanding its own negative externalities. 197 Among i-
nancial firms, the costs of incurring financial risk extend well beyond
those who decide to do so-a negative externality unlikely to be fully
considered (or priced) by managers or shareholders when selecting
what risk levels are optimal. Regulation induces firms to internalize
some of those costs, rather than having them fully borne by the pub-
lic. Absent that regulation, firms are likely to assume more financial
risk than is socially optimal.198
An alternative is to separate financial firms into different catego-
ries, resulting in different levels of regulation for different types of
firms. Separate regulatory standards can minimize the number of
events likely to trigger a common response. Problems with this ap-
proach, however, largely overtake its benefits. First, a substantial
amount of financial activity is concentrated within a limited universe.
For example, the banking industry's five largest firms hold more than
90% of the industry's derivatives. 199 Differentiating among them may
not be practical. Second, creating different regulatory standards can
result in arbitrage, with firms adjusting businesses in order to mini-
mize regulatory cost. The resulting impact is difficult to anticipate
and, in any event, would still be likely to result in greater uniformity as
firms moved to the lowest-cost standard. And, third, focusing only on
regulation overlooks the importance of nonregulatory market stan-
dards. VaR's use in the repo market, for example, can still increase
uniformity even if it is not a regulatory requirement for all firms.
New technologies may also break the feedback effect of VaR-
based regulation. A new measure has been developed (but not yet
196 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 126, at 2-3.
197 See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
198 For example, the costs of a bank run resulting from the bank's decision to assume a
risky loan portfolio can be substantial. The bank, its shareholders, and its customers are
harmed as the bank is forced to sell assets at below-market prices. Other banks may also
experience a decline in business, or even a run, as concerns over financial instability
spread across the market. Borrowers, as a result, may not be able to obtain funding at the
same cost, restricting their ability to invest in new, value-enhancing projects and causing a
slowdown in the general economy. A description of the economic impact of a systemic
shock appears in Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation
of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 257, 264-65 (1983), and Charles W. Calomiris, Is
Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, 50J. EcoN. HisT. 283, 284 (1990). Thus,
financial regulation restricts the amounts and types of risk bearing that a financial firm can
assume. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
199 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENcY, ADM'R OF NAT'L BANKs, OCC's QUARTERLY RE-
PORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVEs AcTIVITIES: THIRD QUARTER 2008, at 1, 5-7 (2008),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-15 2 a.pdf.
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tested) to estimate a firm's contribution to systemic risk, taking into
account the impact of its trading activities on others (and the impact
of others' activities on the firm).200 Other proposals would create
countercyclical capital regulation-intended to raise capital levels
when the economy is strong and lower them during a downturn, soft-
ening the impact of a decline in lending when the markets weaken.201
Both technologies are directed at the financial markets as a whole,
rather than individual firms, which is a step beyond the current regu-
latory focus. Yet, even if they address specific problems with capital
regulation, they are not a solution to the broader consequences of
greater coordination.
These solutions-and their inability to fully address coordina-
tion's effects-suggest a more basic problem with how the financial
markets are regulated. Recall the earlier description of coordination
in the financial markets. Each of the three coordination models-the
Stag Hunt, Dove-Hawk, and Battle of the Sexes Games-is based on
the players' collective expectation of how each of them will behave, with
the outcome driven by each player's individual actions in response to
that expectation. 202 Changes in expectation can have a sudden and
significant impact on how individual participants react. And, to the
extent individuals are encouraged to act in the same way, we would
expect the impact-prompted by a uniform response-to be magni-
fied.203 As the Stag Hunt Game illustrates, bank runs are prompted by
collective expectations over how other depositors will behave. 204
Banks are in the business of balancing depositors' interests in liquid
assets against investments they make in less liquid loans. Depositors
benefit so long as each of them remains confident in the bank's stabil-
ity. If they panic, however, their expectation that others will withdraw
money first is likely to cause them to withdraw as well, making the
bank vulnerable to runs.205 The key, then, to stopping a bank run is
to adjust depositors' expectations. 206 Bank runs would be common if
everyone were encouraged to react in the same way.20 7 Deposit insur-
200 See Tobias Adrian & Markus K. Brunnermeier, CoVar 1-6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
New York, Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 348, 2010), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/
research/staff-reports/sr348.pdf.
201 See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 126, at 31-37.
202 See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
203 See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty 17-19, 51 (UC Berkeley Sch. of Law Public Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1555343, 2010), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=15 5 5 3 4 3 .
204 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
205 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Li-
quidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 403-04 (1983).
206 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics 48-49 (Emory
Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 0948, 2010), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=1518836.
207 See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 205, at 409.
3592011]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ance, in response, lowers the likelihood of panic-induced withdrawals
by assuring each depositor that others will continue, as they have, to
invest in the bank. 208 In the same way, financial regulation must antic-
ipate the impact of rules and market standards that encourage uni-
form behavior, either by changing expectations or minimizing the
negative effects of coordination.
A focus on individuals alone-without taking account of group-
wide expectations-would be inadequate. Yet, financial regulation
and market standards typically center on individual firms, each con-
sidered separately, 209 with market participants often looking to mini-
mize their own transaction costs through greater standardization. 210
The result is that new regulation and standards can create their own
negative externalities, reinforcing downturns in the financial markets.
Expanding the scope of regulation beyond individual firms-taking
account of the system-wide costs of greater uniformity-can help fill
gaps in today's regulatory framework. Regulators must monitor the
impact of new regulation on uniformity and, going forward, adjust
regulation to take account of unanticipated costs. Doing so requires a
system-wide perspective on financial risk management, beyond simply
a focus on the stability of individual firms. The Dodd-Frank Act is a
positive step in the right direction, permitting continued monitoring
of systemic risk and the costs of new regulation. 211 The key, of course,
is how this new authority will be implemented.
In addition, regulators must begin to monitor market standards
more closely-to date, largely the role of trade associations and pri-
vate firms-as well as manage how market standards develop. To be
clear, my purpose is not to throw the baby out with the bath water.
Greater standardization can minimize transaction costs and further
enhance market efficiency. Market standards, however, can have the
same negative effects as regulation, raising many of the same con-
cerns. Consequently, a comprehensive review of financial market sta-
bility must take market standards into account. Financial firms
benefit individually from standards that reduce transaction costs, and
so individual firms have little incentive (and limited information) to
police those standards themselves. 212
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that coordination-reinforced by regula-
tion and market standards-can magnify a downturn in the financial
208 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 52-59, 125 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
212 See Bookstaber Testimony, supra note 142, at 6.
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markets. Greater coordination erodes the randomness presumed by
financial risk management, creating new costs that new regulation
must take into account. Measuring those costs can be difficult. In
extreme cases, coordination can result in a rapid decline in asset val-
ues as market participants are driven to sell in a volatile market.
Under normal circumstances, however, coordination's costs are less
clear. Aspects may be open to empirical measurement, for example,
by assessing VaR's impact on a firm's decision to buy or sell assets.
Likewise, it may be possible to measure the extent to which uniform
contracts like the CSA affect asset prices under ordinary conditions.
But perhaps the problem is more fundamental. The core issue
may be that randomness is simply not how the markets operate, and
regulations and standards that promote coordination are only one
facet of an overall inclination toward uniformity. There is evidence
that, even without regulation or standards, a group of people-each
acting separately-can naturally begin to act in synchrony. The sci-
ence in this area is still developing-it ranges from studies involving
fireflies and crickets (which, as a group, can begin to flash and chirp
in concert) 213 to self-organizing traffic patterns that can optimize
travel flow.2 14 What it suggests, however, is that even in Adam Smith's
world,215 individuals who act separately can also begin to act in uni-
son.216 If that is true in the financial markets, then perhaps we should
reconsider the basic approach to financial risk management. It also
suggests a new role for regulation-a principal function, in that case,
may need to be in managing market expectations in light of the natu-
ral tendency toward greater coordination.
213 See STROGATZ, supra note 8, at 11-14, 234-37.
214 See Dirk Helbing & Bernardo A. Huberman, Coherent Moving States in Highway Traf-
fic, 396 NATURE 738, 738-40 (1998).
215 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
216 See STROGATZ, supra note 8, at 250-51.
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APPENDIx A-VALUE AT RiSK
J.P. Morgan developed VaR in the 1980s before VaR became pub-
lic (under the RiskMetrics brand name) at no charge in 1994.217 Ini-
tially, VaR was a specialized tool primarily known to a closed universe
of risk managers. It quickly became a standard of both financial and
nonfinancial firms, largely due to J.P. Morgan's efforts, which in-
cluded providing clients with both detailed directions on how to im-
plement VaR as well as key factors necessary to calculate it that were
updated daily on the Internet.218 Within six years, over 100,000 physi-
cal copies of J.P. Morgan's technical manual had been distributed,
and over 1,000 online copies were being downloaded every month.219
By 2001, over 5,000 firms around the world had adopted RiskMetrics's
version of VaR as a standard measure of market risk.220
VaR estimates the maximum potential loss a portfolio can suffer
over x period of time at y probability ("confidence level") under nor-
mal circumstances.2 2 ' To use a simple illustration, 222 suppose a risk
manager is asked to estimate VaR for a $100 million portfolio of high
investment-grade five-year corporate bonds over a one-month time ho-
rizon and with a 99% confidence level. In plain English, she would be
asked to determine the maximum loss the portfolio could suffer dur-
ing ninety-nine out of 100 months. To do so, she would need to first
simulate prospective returns on the portfolio, typically by using histor-
ical data. If data on the bonds were unavailable or insufficient, she
would rely instead on data from a comparable security, such as five-
year U.S. Treasury notes (for which there is a substantial history). A
fifty-year period would yield 600 one-month observations of when the
Treasuries rose in value, declined, or stayed the same, and the magni-
tude of any change. For simplicity, I will assume that (i) the changes
in monthly value ranged between minus- and plus-4.2%, (ii) the two
highest loss rates were 4% and 4.2%, and (iii) there were three sepa-
rate, one-month periods when losses were 4% and three other one-
month periods when losses were 4.2%. As illustrated in Diagram 3, if
the results were graphed, with the x-axis as the range of possible re-
turns (4.2% to +4.2%) and the y-axis as the number of occurrences,
the risk manager would see the following:
217 See Dowo, supra note 84, at 18; Till Guldimann, The Story of RiskMetrics, RISK, Jan.
2000, at 56, 58.
218 See Down, supra note 84, at 19-20; HOLTON, supra note 83, at 18-19.
219 See JORGE MINA & JERRY YI XIAO, RETURN To RisKMETRiCs: THE EvoLuTION OF A
STANDARD 1 (2001), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/system/files/private/rrm-
final.pdf.
220 See Henry T. C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and the
Public Corporation Mode 60 Bus. L. 1303, 1346 (2005).
221 See Down, supra note 84, at 38-39.
222 This illustration is derived from JORION, supra note 65, at 17-20.
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DIAGRAM 3: DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY RETURNS ON A PORTFOLIO OF
FIvE-YEAR TREASURIES
No. of Occurrences
-4.2 -4 -2 0 2 4 4.2
% Return
At a 99% confidence level, the risk manager would need to deter-
mine the worst 1% of possible losses which, extrapolating from the
Treasury observations, would be the six occurrences (6 + 600 = 1%)
when losses were 4% or worse. The risk manager could then con-
clude that, at a 99% confidence level, the $100 million bond portfolio
would lose no more than 4% of its value, resulting in a VaR of $4
million (4% x $100 million). Stated differently, a VaR of $4 million
would mean that the portfolio's maximum loss was projected to ex-
ceed $4 million during only one out of 100 one-month periods.223
VaR, however, does not predict the magnitude of losses during the
remaining one-month period (the "tail" of the distribution), which
may be considerably greater than $4 million. 224
What if the firm imposed a VaR limit of $3 million on the portfo-
lio? To avoid violating the cap, the portfolio manager would need to
lower the portfolio's estimated risk of loss from $4 million to $3 mil-
lion. Selling bonds and buying five-year Treasuries would have no ef-
223 See Duffle & Pan, supra note 91, at 8-9; Leippold, supra note 83, at FA2.
224 See Berkowitz & O'Brien, supra note 88, at 4-5; Darryll Hendricks, Evaluation of
Value-at-Risk Models Using Historical Data, FRBNY EcON. PoL'v REv., Apr. 1996, at 39, 51-53;
see also Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital: It's a Short-Term Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2008, at BU1 (noting that the recent financial crisis prompted Wall Street to realize that
even models such as VaR are "subject to error and . . . uncertainties that inevitably afflict
human forecasts"). As a result, two portfolios can have similar VaRs, even though one is
projected, like in the example, to lose up to $4.2 million during the remaining one-month
period and the other could lose up to $42 million (or greater) during the same period. See
Danieisson, supra note 63, at 1289-90; Duffie & Pan, supra note 91, at 11-13; Leippold,
supra note 83, at FA2-FA3. Consequently, in an effort to enhance returns, a VaR-con-
strained manager may have an incentive to increase overall risk, but only to the extent any
probable loss materializes in a significantly declining market (beyond the normal distribu-
tion). See Basak & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 372-73; Arjan Berkelaar et al., The Effect of VaR
Based Risk Management on Asset Prices and the Volatility Smile, 8 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 139, 161-62
(2002); Kashyap et al., supra note 143, at 9.
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fect on VaR, since the model presumes that both respond to similar
risks in the same way. Instead, the manager could diversify into other
instruments-selling bonds and buying assets with lower correlations
(and a lower level of losses at 1%) than five-year Treasuries. She
might also decide to sell $25 million in bonds, reducing her total port-
folio to $75 million and her VaR to $3 million (4% x $75 million).225
Among its simplifications, VaR assumes that market factors and
portfolio returns fall along a normal distribution. 2 2 6 Actual returns,
however, typically do not, particularly if the market is volatile or cor-
relations increase across a portfolio's assets. 2 2 7 VaR can also under-
state risk if market conditions have changed or the portfolio's assets
have only a limited performance history.228 In addition, extreme
events-like the 2007 financial crisis-are sufficiently rare that they
are unlikely to be reflected in historical data or a normal
distribution.229
VaR's reliance on historical data can also impair its accuracy.230
For example, VaR may not fully reflect a portfolio's riskiness if it is
based on data from a period when market volatility was unusually
low.2 3 ' UBS (a large, multinational financial services firm) relied on
VaR to manage its structured investments, including instruments tied
to the subprime mortgage market. Following substantial losses, its in-
vestigation revealed that VaR had been based on data during a period
of positive growth that did not adequately reflect its portfolio's
risks.232
225 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 75, at 13-18 (illustrating the impact of diversification
on VaR).
226 See GRAu, STRESS TESTING, supra note 120, at 3-4.
227 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 75, at 9-10; Tanya Styblo Beder, VAR Seductive but
Dangerous, 51 FIN. ANALYsrs J., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 12, 20; Szilard P~fka & Imre Kondor,
Evaluating the RiskMetrics Methodology in Measuring Volatility and Value-at-Risk in Financial
Markets, 299 PHYSICA A 305, 309 (2001).
228 See SENIOR SUPERVISORS, supra note 122, at 15; Loretan & English, supra note 144, at
15-17.
229 See Bookstaber Testimony, supra note 142, at 3-5; Beder, supra note 227, at 20; Hu,
supra note 220, at 1347.
230 See DowD, supra note 84, at 22.
231 See Linsmeier & Pearson, supra note 86, at 59-60.
232 See UBS AG, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS's WRrTE-DowNs 38 (2008), available at
http://www.ubs.com/l/ShowMedia/investors/shareinformation/shareholderreport/
remediation?contentld=140333&name=080418ShareholderReport.pdf.
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